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Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte
GmbH: International Arbitration and Its
Enforcement Under the New York Convention
I. Introduction
The use of arbitration has been an increasingly favored method
of alternative dispute resolution for international commercial
disputes.' Arbitration's. efficiency and its inexpensive nature,
particularly compared to litigation, constitute two of the primary
reasons for its growing popularity.2 Given the potential for the
burdensome, complex, and duplicative litigation of international
commercial transactions, it is no wonder that international
business entities show a preference for arbitration, which provides
a "faster, less expensive and more flexible" forum than litigation.3
International arbitration, however, is not free from problems.4
Frequently, issue is taken with the authority of the arbitrator, the
legitimacy of the arbitrator's decision, or the difficulty of
enforcing an international arbitral award.5 The Eleventh Circuit
I See H.R. Rep. No. 91-1181, at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601
("In the Committee's view, the provisions [9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.] ... will serve the best
interests of Americans doing business abroad by encouraging them to submit their
commercial disputes to impartial arbitration for awards which can be enforced in both
U.S. and foreign courts."); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985) ("As international trade has expanded in recent
decades, so too has the use of international arbitration to resolve disputes arising in the
course of that trade."). See generally Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United
States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1049 (1961) (noting that businessmen, in general,
prefer arbitration to litigation because it "combines finality of decision with speed, low
expense, and flexibility").
2 See Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (1lth Cir.
1981) (stating that the purpose of the New York Convention is to "relieve congestion in
the courts and to provide parties with an alternative method for dispute resolution that
would be speedier and less costly than litigation." (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,
474 (1953)).
3 Bergesen v.. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 929 (2d Cir. 1983).
4 See id. (stating that there have been problems with enforcing arbitration awards).
' See id.
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confronted such problems in Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N.
Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH,' a case arising out of an industrial
construction dispute ,between American. corporations and a
German corporation that involved torts, breach of contract, and
warranty.7  The Eleventh Circuit had, to decide an issue of first
impression-whether the 'Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention)
and the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) govern an arbitral award that was granted to a foreign
corporation by an arbitral panel sitting in the United States and
applying U.S. federal or state law.' This" issue required the
Eleventh Circuit to delve into both the extensive history of the
New York Convention and the accompanying background law.
The Eleventh Circuit encountered additional issues. It had to
decide whether the admission of expert testimony and technical
support conformed to the adopted rules of the arbitration
agreement.9 The Eleventh Circuit examined whether a defense
existed against enforcement based on "arbitrary and capricious"
grounds.0  The court also considered whether the award of
prejudgment interest was proper in an arbitration proceeding. '
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against M.A.N.
Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH.'2
6 141 F.3d 1434 (11th Cir. 1998).
7 See id. at 1437-39; Nitram, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers, 848 F. Supp. 162,
164 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
8 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1440; see generally Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, Pub. L. No.
91-368, § 1, July 31, 1970, 84 Stat. 692 (amended 1970) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-
208 (1998)) [hereinafter The New York Convention] ("This Convention shall apply to
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other
than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and
arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply
to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition
and enforcement are sought.").
9 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d. at 1442-43.
10 Id. at 1445-46.
11 See id. at 1446-47.
12 See id. at 1447-48.
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The Eleventh Circuit held that the federal district court for the
Middle District of Florida correctly denied petitioners' motion to
vacate an international commercial arbitration award and
remanded the issue of prejudgment interest for reconsideration. 3
In addition, it reversed the district court's imposition of Rule 11
sanctions.14 Furthermore, the holding in Industrial Risk Insurers
highlights the strong presumption among the circuits in favor of
arbitrating international transactional disputes. 5 The Eleventh
Circuit's holding also underscores the immense latitude given to
the arbitration process.16
Part II of this Note discusses the facts and the procedural
history of Industrial Risk Insurers, the Eleventh Circuit's holding,
and the reasoning stated by the Court." Part III analyzes the
background law upon which the Eleventh Circuit relied.'" Part IV
discusses the significance of the case in light of the background
law. 9 Finally, Part V concludes that the Eleventh Circuit's
holding, although consistent with precedent, is not wholly
satisfactory. 2°  Of particular concern for the international
commercial community, the Industrial Risk Insurers decision
appears to indicate that the Eleventh Circuit views an international
arbitration settlement to be acceptable regardless of the means by
which it was reached.2'
H. Statement of the Case
A. The Facts of the Case
Industrial Risk Insurers involved a complex commercial
dispute. In 1985 Nitram, Inc., a Florida manufacturer, contracted
with Barnard and Burk Group (BBG), a Texas corporation, for the
'3 See id. at 1437.
14 See id.
15 See id. at 1440.
16 See id.
17 See infra notes 22-95 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 96-350 and accompanying text.
'9 See infra notes 351-417 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 418-21 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 418-22 and accompanying text.
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installation of a tail pipe expander in Nitram's nitric acid plant.
In turn, BBG assigned Barnard and Burk Engineers and
Construction, Inc., a Louisiana corporation, to do the design
engineering work for the installation.23 BBG then contracted with
ISI, another Louisiana corporation, to do the construction for the
installation .
Barnard and Burk assigned to Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-
Nurnberg AG (MAN AG), a German manufacturer, the duty of
providing the tail pipe expander. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte
GmbH (MAN GHH), as the successor-in-interest to MAN AG,
was responsible for the design, manufacturing, and delivery of the
expander to Barnard and Burk, which would be in charge of the
piping for the expander.26 In addition, MAN GHH contracted to
provide technical support for the installation process."
Problems began after the installation of the tail pipe expander
in late 1984 and early 1985.8 In January 1985 a wreck occurred
when Nitram attempted to crank the expander. 29  The wreck
deformed the machinery, destroying the seals around the piping. °
Parts of the expander were returned to Germany for repairs and
modifications.3' In March 1985 a second attempt to start the
turbine expander resulted in another wreck.32 The machine was
rebuilt, and subsequent attempts to start the expander proved
successful.33 Nevertheless, the two wrecks in 1985 resulted in
significant downtime and millions of dollars in losses.
3 4
22 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1437.
23 See id. at 1438.
24 See id. Barnard and Burk, Barnard and Burk Engineers and Construction, Inc.,
and ISI are hereinafter known as "Barnard and Burk."
25 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1438.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 See id.
"' See id.
32 See id.
31 See id.
34 See id.
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Nitram had purchased risk insurance from Industrial Risk
Insurers (IRI), a Connecticut corporation that provides business
risk insurance to large corporations.35 IRI refused to compensate
Nitram for the first wreck, claiming that because Barnard and
Burk's poor design and defective piping caused the damage, the
losses were not covered by Nitram's policy.3 6 The second wreck,
however, was partially covered by Nitram's policy.
7
In October 1985 Nitram sued IRI and Barnard and Burk,
alleging "that one of them had to pay for the remaining losses
from the second wreck."3 IRI cross-claimed to recover money
from Barnard and Burk for damages already paid to Nitram
resulting from the second wreck.39 The parties removed the case
from state court to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, which maintained jurisdiction on diversity
grounds. 4° Barnard and Burk counter-claimed against Nitram for
breach of contract.4 ' Barnard and Burk also filed a third-party
claim against MAN GHH, alleging that MAN GHH's faulty
expander, and not Barnard and Burk's design, caused the wrecks.
Nitram settled with IRI who, as a result, subrogated its claims
43
against Barnard and Burk to Nitram's pre-existing ones. In April
1987 MAN GHH moved to compel arbitration of Barnard and
Burk's claims pursuant to the arbitration clause in MAN GHH's
contract with Barnard and Burk. 4  According to the clause,
arbitration would follow the American Arbitration Association
guidelines and Florida law.45 The arbitration would be binding.46
In July 1987 the district court ordered arbitration of Barnard and
" See id.
36 See id.
17 See id.
38 Id.
39 See id.
'4 See id.
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 See id.
4 See id.
45 See id. at 1438-39.
6 See id. at 1439.
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Burk's third-party claim against MAN GHH, pursuant to the
provision in the contract between the parties."
In December 1987 Nitram amended its complaint to make tort
and breach of warranty claims directly against MAN GHH,
claiming that the expander was defective, poorly designed, and
inadequately manufactured.48  Nitram also demanded
indemnification if found liable to Barnard and Burk.49 IRI added a
cross-claim against MAN GHH.5 ° In August 1988 the district
court ordered arbitration of these additional claims.'
In the interim, Barnard and Burk settled with Nitram and IRI."
2
Three conflicts, however, remained for the arbitrator: (1) the
claim Barnard and Burk filed against MAN GHH; (2) Nitram's
claim against MAN GHH; and (3) IRI's claim against MAN GHH
as Nitram's subrogee." All three disputes revolved around the
central issue of liability-whether it was MAN GHH's expander
or Barnard and Burk's design and piping that caused the wrecks.54
In March 1993 Barnard and Burk moved for Rule 11 sanctions
against MAN GHH, alleging that MAN GHH had tried to
relitigate the matter of arbitral venue." In July 1993 the district
court found that venue had already been decided and, thus,
imposed sanctions against MAN GHH.56 In May 1993 the
arbitration panel ruled in favor of MAN GHH, stating that Barnard
and Burk's design and piping caused the two wrecks, not MAN
GHH's expander.57 The arbitral panel then awarded MAN GHH
costs and conversion rate compensation."
47 See id.
48 See id.
41 See id. at 1438.
1o See id. at 1439.
51 See id.
52 See id.
13 See id.
14 See id.
5 See id.
56 See id.
7 See id.
58 See id.
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Barnard and Burk, pursuant to the arbitration award, moved for
the district court to vacate the award on the grounds that the
arbitrators' decision was "arbitrary and capricious."5 9  It also
argued that the panel improperly admitted unfairly prejudicial
expert testimony and evidence.6o Barnard and Burk further
claimed that the costs award and conversion rate compensation
should be vacated. 6' The district court denied Barnard and Burk's
motion to vacate the arbitration panel's decision and affirmed the
award.62
B. The District Court Holding
The district court, which had authority to vacate or confirm the
arbitration award, found its standard of review in Chapter 1 of the
FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, requiring the court to uphold and enforce
the arbitrator's decision unless grounds for vacating it are both
raised and substantiated.63  The district court held that the
arbitration panel's decision to call its own expert witness who
once had been retained by the respondent IRI to examine and
redesign the expander after the first wreck in January 1985 was not
so prejudicial as to require vacating the award.64 It found,
moreover, that the submission of this expert witness' report was
neither unreasonable nor unfairly prejudicial so as to justify
vacating the arbitral award. 65 The district court also stated that the
59 Id.
o See id.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See Nitram, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers, 848 F. Supp. 162, 165 (M.D. Fla.
1994); see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)-(e) (1998) (indicating that a district court may only
vacate an award if the award was "procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means," or if
the arbitrator was engaged in "misconduct," or if the arbitrator exceeded his power).
64 See Nitram, Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 165-66 (stating that plenty of opportunity was
given for cross-examination and that the expert witness testimony was not the only piece
of evidence considered by the arbitration panel to suggest that Barnard and Burk,
Nitram, or IRI was prejudiced).
65 See id. at 166 (noting that arbitration is not bound by traditional rules of
procedure or evidence). The district court further stated that it would not review the
arbitration award de novo because of the deference shown to arbitral awards. See id. at
165. The district court stated that the award would not be vacated because the
respondents failed to indicate a specific public policy that was being violated as a result
1999]
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arbitrators' determination that Barnard and Burk's defective piping
installation caused the two wrecks was not arbitrary and capricious
and did not violate any expressed public policy.66  Lastly, the
district court held that the arbitration panel's award of costs was
not arbitrary or capricious because the respondents failed to show
how the award was a "wholesale departure from the law" or that
the award was not based upon the arbitration provision of the
contract.
67
C. The Eleventh Circuit Decision
This case came before the Eleventh Circuit on the presumption
that it was based on diversity grounds.6' The Eleventh Circuit
reviewed the district court's motion of denial and addressed four
questions posed by Bamard and Burk.69  Barnard and Burk
specifically asked the Court to consider: (1) whether the
arbitrators failed to carry out arbitration proceedings in strict
conformity with the arbitration clause in the parties' agreement;7 °
(2) whether the award should be vacated because of the admission
of expert witness testimony and of a technical report;7' (3) whether
the district court abused its discretion in deciding that the
arbitration awards were not "arbitrary and capricious";72 and (4)
of the admissions. See id. at 166.
66 See id. at 166-67.
67 Id. ("An Award is arbitrary and capricious only if a legal ground for the
arbitrators decision cannot be inferred from the facts of the case... [and] if the
reasoning is so palpably faulty that no judge, or group of judges, could ever conceivably
have made such a ruling." (citing Safeway Stores v. American Bakery and
Confectionery Workers, Local 111, 390 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1968)).
68 See Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1439-40 (11 th Cir. 1998).
69 See id. at 1439.
70 See id. In response to the petitioner's argument that the arbitration panel's
failure to conduct the international arbitration in conformity with the parties' agreement
required the district court to vacate the arbitration award, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the panel acted in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), which are "intentionally written loosely, in order to allow arbitrators to resolve
disputes without the many procedural requirements of litigation." Id. at 1443-44.
7" See id. at 1439. The Eleventh Circuit did not find admission of the evidence or
the testimony to be in violation of the AAA rules, nor did the testimony violate public
policy as outlined in the New York Convention. See id. at 1443.
72 Id. at 1439. As to the appellant's argument that the arbitral award should be
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whether the cost awards and conversion rate compensation should
also be vacated with the arbitral award.73
The Eleventh Circuit sua sponte examined the source of its
jurisdiction,74 and reviewed de novo the district court's decision.75
The court concluded that an arbitral award rendered within the
United States, under American law, falls within the boundaries of
the New York Convention and is therefore governed by Chapter 2
of the FAA when one of the parties involved has its domicile or
principal place of business in a foreign state.76 The Eleventh
Circuit held that it had federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to the New York Convention, not diversity jurisdiction.7 The
Eleventh Circuit supported its finding by stating that MAN GHH's
arbitration award fell under the auspices of the New York
Convention.78 The court indicated that the award was "non-
domestic" because it was made under the "legal framework" of a
foreign country.79 Specifically, the award was granted to MAN
GHH, a German corporation, by an American arbitration panel in
Tampa, Florida. ° The award, therefore, was "non-domestic." 8'
The court also stated that the panel's decision to admit into
evidence the technical report and expert witness testimony came
vacated because the decision of the panel to grant the award was "arbitrary and
capricious," the Eleventh Circuit found no basis for such a defense within Chapter 2 of
the FAA. Id. at 1443.
7" See id. at 1439.
14 See id.
11 See id. at 1443.
76 See id. at 1441.
7 See id. at 1439-43; see also 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1998) ("The district courts of the
United States... shall have original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding.").
The district court, in essence, did not go beyond Chapter 1 of the FAA and rested its
jurisdiction in diversity. This plain error, however, could have been avoided had the
district court looked to Chapter 2 of the FAA, which clearly provides the district court
with original subject matter jurisdiction. See 9 U.S.C. § 203.
78 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1440-41.
71 Id.; see also The New York Convention, art. I, reprinted in note following 9
U.S.C.S. § 201 (1971) ("[The New York Convention] shall also apply to arbitral awards
not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement
are sought.").
80 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1441.
81 Id.
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within the boundaries of the American Arbitration Act and,
therefore, was not a violation of public policy. 2  The Eleventh
Circuit noted that the appellants failed to cite any rule of civil
procedure or evidence or case law that established a prohibition on
"side-switching" as it pertained to the facts of this case. 3 The
court, furthermore, reiterated that arbitration procedures do not
follow the strict structures of normal civil litigation. 4 Instead,
arbitration enjoys great latitude in the name of efficiency."
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit held that there was no
"arbitrary and capricious" defense available in Chapter 2 of the
FAA to vacate the arbitration award.86  The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that "arbitrary and capricious" did not fall within the
seven exclusive, enumerated defenses against enforcement of
international awards. 7 It interpreted the absence of such language
to be a conscious decision by Congress, and therefore refused to
expand the statute's reach. The Eleventh Circuit, moreover,
stated that, contrary to the district court's ruling, federal law
permitted the award of prejudgment interest as an equitable
remedy, and remanded this issue for determination by the district
court.89 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that awarding prejudgment
interest is at the discretion of the court and should be granted
absent any reason to the contrary.9 Furthermore, because the
Eleventh Circuit held that Chapter 2 of the FAA controlled, federal
law, not state law, dictated the entitlement and rate of prejudgment
interest.9' The district court failed to exercise its discretion to
82 See id. at 1443-45 (stating that arbitration proceedings do not follow the normal
constraints of litigation's rules of evidence and procedure (quoting Robbins v. Day, 954
F.2d 679, 685 (1 1th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by First Options of Chicago
v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995))).
83 Id. at 1444-45.
' See id. at 1443-44.
85 See id.; see, e.g., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N R. 3.
86 Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1445-46.
87 Id. at 1446.
88 See id.
89 See id. at 1446-47.
90 See id.
9' See id. at 1447.
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determine whether or not to grant the interest award.92
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the district court abused
its discretion by improperly granting Rule 11 sanctions and
reversed the district court's decision on this issue.93 MAN GHH's
motion for a preliminary injunction limiting the scope of
arbitration was grounded in the record and, therefore, was not
frivolous.94 The Eleventh Circuit characterized as clear error the
district court's determination that MAN GHH's motion was
baseless. 9
Il. Background Law
in deciding Industrial Risk Insurers, the Eleventh Circuit faced
fundamental problems that, have plagued the procedure and
enforcement of international arbitration. The Eleventh Circuit
addressed several issues'ranging from jurisdictional authority to
sanctions.96 In order t6 carry out its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit
relied heavily on its own precedent.97 In addition, the court
examined other circuits' opinions and turned to the Supreme Court
for guidance on the history, judicial interpretation, congressional
intent, and application of the New York Convention, adopted by
the United States through Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act.98
A. History and Interpretation of the New York Convention
To understand fully the implications of Industrial Risk
Insurers, it is necessary to examine the focal statutory provision,
the New York Convention, ratified under 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 208.
The New York Convention was assembled to rectify numerous
problems" created by the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration
92 See id.
93 See id. at 1447-50.
94 See id. at 1450.
91 See id.
96 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1439.
97 See id. at 1442-50.
98 See id. at 1440-47.
99 For a more elaborate discussion of the problems which arose from the two
previous treaties, the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses and the Geneva
1999]
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Clauses0 and the 1927 Geneva Convention on the Execution of
Foreign Arbitral Awards. °1 The initial drafters intended the New
York Convention to govern the enforcement of non-domestic
arbitration awards.10 2  Disputes arose during the New York
Convention as to the interpretation of what would constitute a
"foreign award."'0 3  After much deliberation, however, the
Convention concluded with a substantial number of countries
acceding to the agreement.0 4 House Report 1181 indicated that
the New York Convention would be dealt with and exercised in
the United States under Chapter 2 of the FAA. °5 In addition,
House Report 1181 suggested that the adoption of the New York
Convention would "serve the best interests of Americans doing
business abroad by encouraging them to submit their commercial
disputes to impartial arbitration for awards which can be enforced
in both U.S. and foreign courts."106 The courts have complied with
the legislative history, and have adhered to the purpose of the New
York Convention by exercising restrained discretion and, by an
overwhelming majority, affirming arbitration agreements and
arbitral awards under the guidance of Chapter 2 of the FAA, 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-208.107
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, see Paolo Contini,
International CommercialArbitration, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 288-90 (1959).
1o See Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing
the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 157).
'0' See Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 930 (citing the Geneva Convention on the Execution
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301).
102 See Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 931.
103 Id. A "foreign award" designation triggers the application of the New York
Convention, which was created to "encourage the recognition and enforcement of
international arbitration awards." Id. at 932 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974)).
104 See Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 931-32; see also generally Leonard V. Quigley,
Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961) (discussing the
deliberation process of the New York Convention and the benefits of accession to the
United States).
1o See H.R. Rep. No. 91-1181, at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601.
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985); see infra notes 11.1-17 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction
between Chapters 1 and 2 of the FAA); infra notes 160-61 and accompanying text
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B. Jurisdiction
Prior to Industrial Risk Insurers, the Eleventh Circuit had not
resolved the issue of whether foreign arbitration awards made
within the' United 'States, under American federal or state law,
were enforceable under the New York Convention via Chapter 2
of the FAA. °8 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit looked to decisions from
other circuits to interpret the statutory language of the FAA.'°9 It
then turned its analysis to the role of the courts in upholding
arbitration awards granted under the provisions of the FAA and
the New York Convention.110
In order to determine whether Chapter 1 or Chapter 2 of the
FAA controls arbitration proceedings, a court must determine
whether the arbitration falls within the categories covered by the
New York Convention. "' The Eleventh Circuit in Industrial Risk
Insurers examined cases, such as the Second Circuit's decision in
Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., which held that the New York
Convention only applied to "non-domestic" awards."2  This
definition of "non-domestic" derives from Article I(1) of the New
York Convention. Article I(1) provides two instances where the
court will recognize and enforce arbitration awards-those that are
made in a country other than the state where enforcement is
sought, and those that are not considered domestic in the country
where recognition and enforcement are sought."3 In other words,
Chapter 2 controls international awards." 4
(discussing Chapter l's incorporation into Chapter 2 of the FAA). Chapter 1 of the
FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, contains the general provisions of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-
16 (1998). Chapter 2 is the codification of the New York Convention. See generally
Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 929 (tracing the history of the New York Convention).
108 See Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1440 (11th Cir. 1998).
'09 See id. at 1441.
'o See id. at 1439-42.
"' See id. at 1440.
112 Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932.
"3 See The New York Convention, art. I(1), reprinted in note following 9 U.S.C.S.
§ 201 (1971).
114 However, Chapter 2 was not created to be exclusive from the other provisions of
the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1998). Chapter 2, in 9 U.S.C. § 208, incorporates
Chapter 1 of the FAA, which covers the general provisions of arbitration to the extent
that Chapter 1 does not conflict with Chapter 2. See id. ("Chapter 1 applies to actions
1999]
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Furthermore, depending on which chapter of the FAA controls,
the district court either will have diversity jurisdiction or original
subject matter jurisdiction. To elaborate, Congress under Chapter
2 has conferred original federal. subject matter jurisdiction to
United States district courts. "5 The federal courts, therefore, are
not required to rely on state law.1 6 However, under Chapter 1 of
the FAA, the federal district courts have not been granted original
subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, a party to a domestic arbitration
agreement who wishes to have a federal district court hear its case
must base jurisdiction on diversity. Even then, the district court
will be working under the framework of state arbitration laws.
Chapter 1 only dictates that a federal district court "must grant" an
order confirming the arbitration award, unless the award is
vacated, modified, or corrected."7
The Eleventh Circuit turned to the First, Second, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits for guidance in the interpretation and application of
the New York Convention."8 These circuits have overwhelmingly
accepted the strong presumption in favor of arbitration for
international disputes. "9 For example, although dealing with
Chapter 1 of the FAA, the Eleventh Circuit's Ultracashmere
House, Ltd. v. Meyer"0 decision illustrates the courts' strict
and proceedings brought under this chapter [2] to the extent that chapter is not in
conflict with this chapter or the [New York] Convention as ratified by the United
States.").
"I See H.R. Rep. No. 91-1182, at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3601("Section 203 gives original jurisdiction over any action or proceeding falling
under the Convention to the district courts of the United States regardless of the amount
in controversy." (emphasis added)).
116 Federal courts may want to look to state law for guidance. For example, in
Industrial Risk Insurers, the Eleventh Circuit could have looked to Florida law to
determine whether or not to grant prejudgment interest. See Industrial Risk Insurers,
141 F.3d at 1447.
117 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1998) ("[A]ny party to the arbitration may apply to the court so
specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an
order."); see also supra note 65 (discussing the district court's inability to grant de novo
review).
1I See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1441.
119 See, e.g., Jain v. de Mere, 51 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the New
York Convention specifies that any commercial international arbitration falls within the
New York Convention).
120 664 F.2d 1176 (1 1th Cir. 1981), overruled by Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp.,
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affirmation of arbitration agreements and awards.121 The court
stated that the purpose of the FAA is to provide parties with an
alternative to litigation that would provide a speedier and less
expensive resolution. 22 The Eleventh Circuit also noted that the
FAA, combined with a federal law that upholds contractual
commercial agreements to arbitrate, would preempt any state
common law rule that prohibits the enforcement of arbitration
agreements."'
The Eleventh Circuit looked to other cases to examine how a
court might find the existence of an arbitration agreement and to
what extent must the court uphold this agreement. For example, in
Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 24 the First Circuit held that as long as
no evidence indicated that the arbitration agreement was "null and
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed" under the
auspices of the New York Convention, the parties were required to
submit their. disputes to arbitration.'25 The First Circuit,
furthermore, delineated a four-part test to resolve the issue of
whether a conflict must be submitted to arbitration in accordance
with Chapter 2, the New York Convention: "(1) Is there an
agreement in writing to arbitrate the subject of the dispute?";'26
"(2) Does the agreement provide for arbitration in the territory of a
128 F.3d 1466 (1 1th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, May 26, 1998.
121 See id. at 1180 ("The Act thus overrules the common law precedent prohibiting
enforcement of arbitration agreements and creates a national law favoring such
agreements.").
122 See id. at 1179-80 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)); see also
generally G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE L.J. 829, 888 (1995) (stating that
the New York Convention as enforced through the FAA provides a forum in which
businesses can settle disputes without being subjected to high standards of judicial
review).
123 See Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 664 F.2d at 1180 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1998)).
"Federal and state courts alike are bound, under the supremacy clause, to enforce the
Act's substantive provisions." See id. (citing Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406-07 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 801).
124 684 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1982).
125 Id. at 187; The New York Convention, art. 11 (3), reprinted in note following 9
U.S.C.S. § 201 (1971).
126 Ledee, 684 F.2d at 186 (citing The New York Convention, art. II(1), 11(2)); see
also The New York Convention, art. 1(1), reprinted in note following 9 U.S.C.S. § 201
(1971) (requiring each signatory State to recognized a written arbitration agreement).
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signatory of the Convention?";'27 "(3) Does the agreement arise out
of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is
considered as commercial?"; 12 and "(4) Is a party to the agreement
not an American citizen, or does the commercial relationship have
some reasonable relation with one or more foreign states?"'129 If
the district court answers each of these four questions
affirmatively, then the court is required to order the arbitration to
proceed, and the arbitration will be governed by Chapter 2 of the
FAA. 130
The First Circuit's "Ledee test" exemplifies the relatively
broad interpretation given to the New York Convention.
Conversely, the First Circuit's conclusion that an agreement
should not be enforced only when it is found to be "null and void"
was construed narrowly.' The First Circuit indicated that "null
and void" should only apply to situations "such as fraud, mistake,
duress, and waiver" because those instances can be applied in a
neutral, international backdrop.' 2  This narrow interpretation
reiterates the purpose behind the New York Convention: to "unify
the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and
arbitral awards are enforced.'
133
One year later, the Second Circuit decided Bergesen v Joseph
Muller Corp., in which it held that a U.S. district court under the
authority of the New York Convention had the ability to enforce
an arbitration award between two foreign entities."' The Second
127 Ledee, 684 F.2d at 186 (citing The New York Convention, art. 1(1), 1(3); 9
U.S.C. § 206 (1998).
12' Ledee, 684 F.2d at 187 (citing The New York Convention, art. 1(3); 9 U.S.C.
§ 202 (1998)).
129 Ledee, 684 F.2d at 187 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 202).
130 See Ledee, 684 F.2d at 187 (citing The New York Convention, art. 11(3)).
13 Ledee, 684 F.2d at 187.
132 Id. (citing I.T.A.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir.1981); see
also Ledee, 684 F.2d at 187 n.3 (indicating that the First Circuit's decision accords with
other appellate courts such as the Second and Third Circuits).
113 Ledee, 684 F.2d at 187 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
517 n.10 (1974)).
134 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983).
131 See id. at 933 (citing Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania Martimia, S.A.,
477 F. Supp. 737, 740-41 (S.D.N.Y.1979), aff'd mem., 620 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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Circuit analyzed the meaning of "awards not considered as
domestic. 136 The court concluded that awards considered "non-
domestic" do not need to be made abroad; instead, they are "non-
domestic" because they are in accordance with foreign law or
involve alien parties.137 The Second Circuit favored this broad
interpretation because it viewed the expansive reading as
facilitating the purpose of the treaty.
13 8
In 1985 the Supreme Court in an antitrust dispute, Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., outlined a two-
step inquiry to aid the courts in determining whether a contest
must be submitted to arbitration: "whether the parties' agreement
to arbitrate reached the statutory issues, and then, upon finding it
did, considering whether legal constraints external to the parties'
agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those claims."'3 9  The
Supreme Court indicated that since arbitration provisions are like
any other contract, the parties' intentions control. 40  The
presumption is that if there is a written arbitration agreement, then
arbitration of the parties' claims would be required. 4' The
Supreme Court, however, also stated that those intentions are
given a more generous construction when pertaining to
arbitration. 142 The Supreme Court went as far as to say that it
construed an arbitration clause to include the disputes at issue
"without pausing at the source in a state statute of the rights
asserted by the parties resisting arbitration.' 13  The Court noted
that the
concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of
foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of
136 Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 930-32.
117 id. at 932.
138 See id. The purpose of the treaty was "to encourage the recognition and
enforcement of international arbitration awards." Id. (citing Scherk v. Alberto Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974)).
3 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v..Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
140 See id. at 626.
141 See id. at 625-28.
142 See id. at 626.
14" Id. at 627 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15, 15 n.7 (1984)).
1999]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
the international commercial system for predictability in the
resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties'
agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be
forthcoming in a domestic context.".44
In other words, the Supreme Court recognized the possibility of
inconsistencies when taking the forum into consideration. This
aspect was crucial in the Eleventh Circuit's decision that the
district court had original jurisdiction, not diversity jurisdiction, as
provided for in the FAA. 1
45
By concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction, the
Eleventh Circuit was not required to apply state law, as would be
the case in diversity. Instead, it was permitted to apply federal
law, specifically Chapter 2 of the FAA, to the arbitration
agreement and award. 46 Through the enabling legislation of the
FAA, the New York Convention became the. "highest law of the
land.' ' 47 The New York Convention goes beyond the scope of the
FAA's Chapter 1, for it gives the district courts authority to
enforce an international arbitration agreement, even if it is beyond
the boundaries of the United States.
4 8
The Supreme Court highlighted the major concerns of
Congress in passing the statutory provisions of Chapter 2 of the
FAA: " 'to enforce private agreements into which parties had
entered,' a concern which 'requires that we rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate.",149  The breadth of such a strong
presumption for arbitration is based not only upon the wishes of
'4 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 629.
141 See Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1439-40 (1 lth Cir. 1998).
146 See id.
147 Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co. (PEMEX), 767 F.2d
1140, 1145 (5th Cir. 1985).
141 See id. at 1145-46; see also 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1998) (stating that a court that has
subject matter jurisdiction under Chapter 2 may enforce the arbitration agreement at any
place, "whether that place is within or without the United States").
141 Mitsubishi Motor Corp., 473 U.S. at 625-26 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). The SupremeCourt also expressed the need for
states to embrace the practice of international arbitration in order for its benefits to take a
strong hold. See id. at 638-39. It aptly noted: "[Ilt will be necessary for national courts
to subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the international policy favoring
commercial arbitration." Id. at 639.
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the parties but also in the interest of international comity. 15 ° The
Supreme Court, moreover, emphasized the compulsion towards
enforcement; to do otherwise would "damage the fabric of
international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and
ability of businessmen to enter into international commercial
agreements." '151 Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in
Mitsubishi Motor Corp., summarized the general purpose of
international arbitration: "Like any other mechanism for resolving
controversies, international arbitration will only succeed if it is
realistically limited to tasks it is capable of performing well-the
prompt and inexpensive resolution of essentially contractual
disputes between commercial partners."' 52
Following close behind the Supreme Court precedent of
Mitsubishi, the Fifth Circuit, in Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos
Mexican Nat'l Oil Co. (Pemex),'53 went on to state that through
Congress's powers and federal law, the Convention would take
150 See id. at 626-30 ("agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is
an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and contracting." (quoting
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972)). The Supreme Court
indicated that this strong favoritism to enforce arbitration agreements applies to
domestic as well as foreign arbitration. See generally id. at 631 ("And at least since this
Nation's accession in 1970 to the Convention... and the implementation of the
Convention in the same year by amendment of the Federal Arbitration Act, that federal
policy [the presumption in favor of enforcing arbitral awards] applies with special force
in the field of international commerce."). It stated that the Federal Arbitration Act, as a
whole, "creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to
honor an agreement to arbitrate (emphasis added)." Id. at 625 (quoting Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)).
151 Mitsubishi Motor Corp., 473 U.S. at 631 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974)).
152 Id. at 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, however, disagreed with the
majority in its approach to evaluating the Court of Appeals holding. See id. at 641
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Stevens believed that the majority's
conclusion was based on the Court's favoritism for arbitration and obscure "notions of
international comity" which were primarily based on the simple fact that the
automobiles involved in Mitsubishi Motor Corp. were made in Japan. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens seemed to imply that the Court went too far in its attempt to
widen the scope of arbitration and its enforcement. See generally id. at 665 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("But just as it is improper to subordinate the public interest in enforcement
of antitrust policy to the private interest in resolving commercial disputes, so is it
equally unwise to allow a vision of world unity to distort the importance of the selection
of the proper forum for resolving this dispute.").
153 767 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1985).
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precedent over "all prior inconsistent rules of law."' 54 The case
involved damages resulting from an oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico, in which all the issues were consolidated into one
proceeding and where one party sought to enforce, an arbitration
clause.'55 The Fifth Circuit held that, because the arbitration falls
under the New York Convention, it had subject matter jurisdiction
over an appeal from the district court's order refusing to require
arbitration of the dispute. 5 6 The presumption is that upon finding
an arbitration agreement, arbitration should be upheld unless it can
be shown with "positive assurance" that an arbitration clause can
be interpreted not to include the disputed issue."' The Fifth
Circuit, therefore, provided a general rule that stated, "[W]henever
the scope of an arbitration clause is in question, the court should
construe the clause in favor of arbitration."'
158
The Fifth Circuit, in addition, stated in unequivocal language,
"This Convention is the supreme law of the land .... Any law or
decision prior in time to this express undertaking must be
construed as consistent with the Convention or set aside by it.'
59
The New York Convention incorporates Chapter 1 of the Federal
Arbitration Act through the enabling legislation of 9 U.S.C.
§ 208.'60 The New York Convention's reach, however, is greater
than the FAA because it can also compel arbitration outside of the
United States under Chapter 2 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 206.161
154 Id. at 1145 ("The Convention was negotiated pursuant to the Constitution's
Treaty power. Congress then adopted enabling legislation to make the Convention the
highest law of the land. (emphasis added)").
"' See id. at 1142-43.
156 See id. at 1149; see also 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1998) (specifying that the courts have
"original jurisdiction" over any actions falling under the New York Convention).
157 Sedco, Inc. 767 F.2d at 1145 (quoting Commerce Park of DFW Freeport v.
Mardian Constr. Co., 729 F.2d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Wick v. Atlantic
Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1979))).
158 Sedco, Inc., 767 F.2d at 1145 (citing United Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960)).
9 Sedco, Inc., 767 F.2d at 1148.
'60 See 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1998).
161 See Sedco, Inc., 767 F.2d at 1146. "A court having jurisdiction under this
chapter may direct that arbitration be held in accordance with the [arbitration] agreement
at any place ... whether that place is within or without the United States (emphasis
added)." 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1998).
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Sedco, Inc. demonstrated how the FAA provides little opportunity
for the district court to exercise discretion.1 62 The Fifth Circuit also
noted that the Supreme Court has mandated that if there is any
doubt concerning the scope of arbitrability, the court should find in
favor of arbitration. 1
63
Several years after the Fifth Circuit holding in Sedco, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit, in Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of
Iran v. Gould, Inc.,' 64 emphasized three requirements for original
jurisdiction before it could be conferred upon a federal district
court pursuant to the New York Convention. 6  According to the
plain meaning of the New York Convention, the court must find
that the award arose from a "legal relationship," that the
relationship was "commercial in nature," and was "not entirely
domestic in scope.' ' 166  The Ninth Circuit upheld an arbitration
award in favor of Iran against an American corporation even
though there was no arbitration agreement between Iran and the
corporation and even though the award was not made pursuant to
any national arbitration law. 167 The court reasoned that the Algiers
Accords drawn between Iran and the United States acted as the
written arbitration agreement, thus meeting the requirements of
Articles II and IV of the New York Convention.
168
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson,69 the Supreme
Court also dealt with the statutory interpretation of the FAA and
determined whether the FAA should be read expansively or
restrictively.' 70 The court held that the basic purpose of the FAA is
162 See Sedco, Inc., 767 F.2d at 1147.
163 See id. at 1147-48 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1982)). The Supreme Court has held that a court must compel
arbitration of arbitratible claims when a motion to compel arbitration is requested. See
id. at 1147 n.20 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985)).
'64 887 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1989).
165 See id. at 1362.
166 Id. (interpreting 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1998)).
167 See id. at 1357.
168 See id. at 1363-64.
169 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
"70 See id. at 268. Although Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. dealt with the statutory
interpretation of 9 U.S.C. § 2, Chapter 1 of the FAA, because Chapter 2 incorporates
Chapter 1 by reference, it seems appropriate to discuss the Supreme Court's analysis of
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"to overcome courts' refusals to enforce agreements to
arbitrate."'' The FAA preempts state law, and states cannot adopt
laws that would invalidate the FAA.'
The Supreme Court evaluated the specific language of Chapter
1 so that it could identify the FAA's reach.'73 The Supreme Court
primarily focused on the language in 9 U.S.C. § 2, which states
that the FAA covers transactions that "involve commerce" and
contains provisions subjecting the transaction to arbitration. 7 4 The
term "involve" is broad and is the functional equivalent of
"affecting.""' 5 This interpretation reflects expansive congressional
intent.' 76  The Supreme Court expressed the belief that an
expansive interpretation is in accordance with the broad scope of
the Commerce Clause, which provides Congress with ample
authority to regulate interstate and, likewise, international
commercial transactions.'7 7  In addition, the statutory language
places the FAA on the same playing field as other contract
terms. 78 Taking these two factors together, the wide latitude the
FAA chapters bestow on the arbitration process emerges. A
narrow interpretation would go against the FAA's purpose, and
would create a "new, unfamiliar test lying somewhere in a no-
man's land between 'in commerce' and 'affecting commerce,'
thereby unnecessarily complicating the law and breeding litigation
from a statute that seeks to avoid it.'
79
§ 2. See 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1998).
17' Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc., 513 U.S. at 270 (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc.
v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)).
172 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc., 513 U.S. at 272 (citing Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984)).
173 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc., 513 U.S. at 272-77.
174 Id. at 268.
17 Id. at 273-74.
176 See id. at 274.
177 See id. (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987)); U.S. CONST. art. 1, §
8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court's analogy between the FAA and the Commerce Clause
seems to be an attempt on the Supreme Court's part to reiterate the congressional intent
of giving arbitration proceedings a wide berth.
178 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc., 513 U.S. at 275 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co. 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
17' Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc., 513 U.S. at 275. However, the Supreme Court
was not unanimous in its holding. See id. at 284-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting; Thomas, J.,
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Only several months after the Supreme Court's decision in
Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc., the Seventh Circuit, in Jain v. De
Mere, was presented with an issue of first impression."* It was
asked to decide, whether a federal court had the authority to
compel arbitration between two foreign entities when the
arbitration agreement did not clearly specify a location for the
arbitration or a method of selecting an arbitrator. 8' The Seventh
Circuit remarked that any commercial arbitral agreement falls
within the scope of the convention so long as it is not solely
between two United States citizens, involves property within the
United States, and has no reasonable relationship with another
foreign entity.12 The Seventh Circuit held that a court could order
arbitration even though the contract did not specify a place of
arbitration.'83 Even when a contract is unclear, the courts have
generally upheld the arbitration.""
The Seventh Circuit, in Jain v. De Mere, moreover, illustrates
how Chapters 1 and 2 of the FAA work in tandem."5 Specifically,
the Seventh Circuit held that, even where a contract does not
specify a place for arbitration or a method of choosing an
dissenting). "[T]he FAA treats arbitration simply as one means of resolving disputes
that lie within the jurisdiction of the federal courts; it makes clear that the breach of a
covered arbitration agreement does not itself provide any independent basis for such
jurisdiction." Id. at 291 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This perspective of the dissenting
justices would reappear in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, which effectively
overrules the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Robbins v. Day. See First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995); see also infra notes 192-204 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court decision in First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan).
180 See Jain v. De Mere, 51 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir.), reh'g denied and cert. denied,
516 U.S. 914 (1995).
181 See id.
182 See id. at 689 (holding that a suit to compel arbitration met the requirements of
Chapter 2 of the FAA when the parties are involved in a commercial transaction but are
not United States citizens). The Seventh Circuit also stated that jurisdiction need only
be based in Chapter 2 of the FAA in which the federal question does not go beyond
arbitration. See id.
183 See id. at 686. The district court for the Northern District of Illinois held that
although it had jurisdiction under Chapter 1 and 2, the FAA did not provide the district
court with the authority to compel arbitration because the arbitration agreement failed to
specify a location for the arbitration and a method to select an arbitrator. See id. at 688.
'4 See id. at 688.
185 See id. at 689-90.
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arbitrator, a court has authority to order arbitration in its own
district when jurisdiction rested solely on Chapter 2.186 The
Seventh Circuit stated that in order for the court to compel
arbitration under Chapter 2, the agreement must state a place
where the arbitration is to be held.'8 7 In Jain, however, the parties
did not specify a specific location.' 88 Nevertheless, the omission
did not mean that the court lost the ability to enforce the
agreement.
The Seventh Circuit noted in its analysis that 9 U.S.C. § 208
incorporates Chapter 1 of the FAA to the extent that it does not
conflict with the New York Convention or Chapter 2.189 It
therefore based its authority to compel arbitration in 9 U.S.C. § 4,
which "requires a court to compel arbitration in its own district
when no other forum is specified."' 90  The Seventh Circuit
concluded that the jurisdictional limits of 9 U.S.C. § 4 would not
prevent the court from compelling arbitration where the court may
not have subject matter jurisdiction independent of the arbitration
agreement. 9 The way in which the Seventh Circuit interpreted
the provisions of Chapters 1 and 2 so that they would work
harmoniously reiterates the strong presumption in favor of
arbitration.
In 1995 the Supreme Court, in First Options of Chicago, Inc.
v. Kaplan, 92 had to determine the standard of review to be applied
to a question of arbitrability.'93  The Supreme Court held
186 See id. at 689-92. For a discussion of how Chapter 2 of the FAA, by
incorporating 9 U.S.C. § 4, permits a court to order arbitration in its own district if the
parties failed to identify an arbitration locale, see infra notes 189-91 and accompanying
text.
187 See id. at 689.
188 See id. 9 U.S.C. § 206 specifically states that a court that has jurisdiction,
pursuant to the fact that the action falls under the New York Convention, may compel
arbitration at the selected location, in accordance with the arbitration agreement. See 9
U.S.C. § 206 (1998).
.89 See Jain, 51 F.3d at 689.
190 Id. at 690 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Lauer, 49 F.3d
323, 327 (7th Cir. 1995)).
'9' See id. at 690-92.
192 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
'- See id. at 940.
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unanimously that a court of appeals should apply ordinary state
law principles of contracts when evaluating issues of arbitrability
but should decide questions of law de novo.' 94 The Court, in
addition, stated that a court of appeals should apply an ordinary
standard of review when reviewing a district court's decision to
uphold an arbitration award. 95 The Supreme Court indicated that
the Eleventh Circuit was in the erroneous minority of circuits that
held that the standard of review should be an "abuse of discretion"
standard. 96  In effect, the Supreme Court's holding in First
Options of Chicago, Inc. overrules the Eleventh Circuit's holding
in Robbins v. Day on this point.'97 The Supreme Court, therefore,
set forth the standard of review that district courts are to use when
faced with a motion to vacate an arbitration award. The Supreme
Court indicated that, although courts are to grant arbitrators a
considerable amount of latitude, this does not mean that the
appellate courts should give "extra leeway" to the district courts
which uphold arbitration decisions.' Instead, the Court stated that
the review should proceed under the same standard as if a court
were deliberating over whether the parties had agreed to submit
the issue to arbitration- an ordinary standard of review.' 99
" See id. at 948. The Supreme Court also noted that courts should not assume that
the parties have agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless both parties have clearly indicated
that they have made such an agreement. See id. at 939. This holding demonstrates how
arbitration agreements are to be read like any other contract and should be enforced in
the same manner.
'9' See id. at 939. Although the discussion of arbitrability is important, it is not an
issue raised in Industrial Risk Insurers. This portion of the Supreme Court's opinion,
discussing the standard of review for motions of vacation of arbitral awards, is the most
relevant issue as it pertains to the analysis of Industrial Risk Insurers. Therefore, the
other issues raised in First Options of Chicago, Inc. will not be discussed in great detail.
196 Id. at 948.
'"I See id.; see also Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 682 (11 th Cir. 1992), overruled
by First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (stating that when a
district court denies vacation of an arbitration award, the standard of review should be
an "abuse of discretion").
19 First Options of Chicago, Inc., 514 U.S. at 948-49 (indicating that the FAA is
silent on the matter of standard of review).
'99 See id. at 947-48. The Supreme Court explained that an "ordinary standard" is
one in which the court will accept findings of fact that are not "clearly erroneous" but
review questions of law de novo. Id.; see supra note 194 and accompanying text. The
Supreme Court indicated that a court of appeals' approach to a district court's decision
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It is important to note, however, that the FAA is silent when it
comes to standard of review.2 0 According to the Supreme Court,
the standard of review may differ depending on who decides the
issue of arbitrability.2 'O Specifically, when there is a dispute over
whether the parties had originally agreed to arbitration, a court will
normally review the dispute of arbitrability under an ordinary
standard of review.0 2 If the parties agreed to arbitration then they
are still allowed to ask the court for review, although the scope is
narrowed considerably. 23 In such a situation, a court will rarely
set aside an arbitrator's decisions.204
The Eleventh Circuit looked at precedent as recent as
September of 1997 when the Second Circuit, in Yusuf Ahmed
Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., confirmed an
arbitration award arising from an international licensing
agreement. 2°' The Second Circuit highlighted the bifurcated nature
of the New York Convention. 20 6 The standard of review as applied
"should depend upon 'the respective institutional advantages of trial and appellate
courts,' not upon what standard of review will more likely produce a particular
substantive result." First Options of Chicago, Inc., 514 U.S. at 947-48 (quoting Salve
Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231-33 (1991)).
200 See id. at 949.
201 See id. at 942.
202 See id.
203 See id. If the arbitration agreement covers a domestic dispute, the parties are
bound by the arbitrator's decision unless the moving party can show that the award was
"procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means." 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1998). If the
arbitration agreement is international in nature, the parties are also bound by the decision
unless the contesting party can show one of the enumerated defenses in the New York
Convention Article V. See The New York Convention art. V, reprinted in note
following 9 U.S.C.S. § 201 (1971).
204 See First Options of Chicago, Inc., 514 U.S. at 942 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (stating that parties will be bound by an arbitrator's decision if
it is not in "manifest disregard" of the law). The Supreme Court also stated that district
and appellate courts should give considerable discretionary power to the arbitrator in
deciding an arbitration issue. See id. at 948. The Eleventh Circuit, therefore, is not
necessarily going against the standard set by the Supreme Court; instead, it seems to be
undertaking interpretative license in its application of the standard of review.
Essentially, the Eleventh Circuit is applying the "abuse of discretion" review in terms of
the arbitrator's decision making and not the district court's decision to affirm an award.
205 See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15,
16-17 (2d Cir. 1997).
206 See id. at 22.
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to arbitration awards depends upon what is being specifically
reviewed. °7 The New York Convention provides that if review is
"in the state in which, or under the law of which, the award is
made," the courts will be given great discretion in setting aside or
modifying the award in accordance with that state's arbitration
laws.0 8 However, when a motion to compel enforcement of the
award is brought in a foreign state, the grounds for refusal are
limited to the defenses provided in Article V of the New York
Convention; thus providing limited discretion to the courts. 0 9 The
Second Circuit also indicated that the reason for a limited review
of arbitral awards is to avoid "undermining the goals of
arbitration"-to settle disputes efficiently and to avoid the
•• • 210
expenses of litigation.
C. The Enumerated Defenses and Evidentiary Issues
Article V of the New York Convention provides seven
enumerated defenses against the enforcement of arbitration
awards.1 Unless one of these defenses is raised and established,
the court must confirm the arbitration award.1 The New York
Convention places the burden of proof on "the party defending
against enforcement. 2 .3  The statutory provision sets forth the
207 See id.
208 Id. at 23.
209 See id.
210 Id. (quoting Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d
Cir. 1993)).
211 See The New York Convention, art. V, reprinted in note following 9 U.S.C.S.
§ 201 (1971). The New York Convention, in whole, is incorporated into Chapter 2 of
the FAA. See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (West 1998) ("The Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be
enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter.").
212 See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1998). Prior to arbitration proceedings, a party may use as a
defense that the parties did not agree to arbitrate the given dispute. See supra notes 139-
41 and accompanying text (discussing how arbitration agreements dictate the context
and procedure of the arbitration). However, once the arbitration has been completed and
the arbitrator has handed down the decision, a court is highly unlikely to change the
results without a contestant raising one of the defenses in the New York Convention.
See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
213 Imperial Ethiopian Gov't v. Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334, 336 (5th Cir.
1976) (citing Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de
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defenses, which are available to a party challenging
enforcement. 214  The circuit courts generally have held that the
parties contesting the arbitral award are strictly limited to the
defenses that are given in the FAA.215 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
had to decide whether the contentions raised by the appellants
were drawn from one of the seven defenses. 16
Although seven specific defenses are enumerated in Article V
of the New York Convention, the Eleventh Circuit in Industrial
Risk Insurers focused on Articles V(1)(d)' 7 and V(2)(b)218 as the
two possible defenses that could be applicable to the case.2 19
Given this limited scope, the Eleventh Circuit only examined
background law applicable to these two particular. defenses and set
aside discussion of the other five defenses for a later, more
L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974)).
214 See The New York Convention, art. V, reprinted in note following 9 U.S.C.S.
§ 201 (1971).
215 See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc., 508 F.2d at 973 (stating
that the New York Convention limits a party's defenses against enforcement of an
arbitral award to the seven defenses set forth under Article V and that the burden of
proof rests in the party raising the defense (citing Contini, supra note 99, at 299)).
216 See Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1441-42 (1 lth Cir. 1998).
217 Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of
the party against whom it is invoked only if that party furnishes to the
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof
that: ... (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place.
The New York Convention, art. V(1)(d), reprinted in note following 9 U.S.C.S. § 201
(1971).
218 Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds
that "[tihe recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
policy of that country." Id. art. V(2)(b).
219 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1442; see also The New York
Convention, art. V(1)(d), art. V(2)(b), reprinted in note following 9 U.S.C.S. § 201
(1971) (stating that an arbitration award may be vacated on the grounds that the
arbitrator or the arbitration procedure was "not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties" or the recognition of the arbitral award would be "contrary to the public policy
of that country").
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appropriate context.220 The appellants argued that the district court
had to vacate the international arbitral award because the
procedure was "not in accordance with the agreement of the
parties., 221 They also contended that the district court should have
refused to enforce the arbitration award because enforcement of it
would be "contrary to the public policy of that country.',222
1. Admission of Evidence-in Accordance With the
Agreement?
The appellants in Industrial Risk Insurers argued that the
arbitrator observed procedures that were not in accordance with
the agreement between the parties and, therefore, the award should
be vacated.223  However, the Eleventh Circuit in Industrial Risk
Insurers noted that the parties to the arbitration agreement had
decided upon the American Arbitration Association's guidelines to
dictate the procedure of the arbitration.224 Rule 3 of the AAA
guidelines allows the parties in an international commercial
arbitration to exchange documentary evidence or lists of
witnesses.2  Furthermore, Rule 3 states that in international cases,
the parties should be able to anticipate what will occur in the
arbitration hearing. 226 "By cooperating in an exchange of relevant
information, the parties can avoid unnecessary delays. 227
It is clear that by adopting a broad interpretation of the AAA's
rules, parties are permitted a great deal of latitude in their
220 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1442-43, 1443 n.10.
221 Id. at 1442; The New York Convention, art. V(1)(d), reprinted in note following
9 U.S.C.S. § 201 (1971).
222 Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1442; The New York Convention, art.
V(2)(b), reprinted in note following 9 U.S.C.S. § 201 (1971).
223 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1442. Barnard and Burk stated that the
arbitration panel should not have considered the technical report because the report was
submitted for review too close to the beginning of the arbitration proceedings, thus
violating the agreed-upon rules of the American Arbitration Association. See id. The
appellants also argued that the arbitration panel should not have permitted an expert
witness to testify because of the possible threat of "side-switching." Id. at 1444.
224 See id. at 1442.
225 See id. at 1443.
226 See id.
227 Id.
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evidentiary proceedings. Specifically, deadlines do not constrain
them. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, "arbitrators are left wide
discretion to require the exchange of evidence, and to admit or
exclude evidence, how and when they see fit."228 The New York
Convention, moreover, remains silent on the matter of timing with
regard to evidentiary issues.229  The only "insufficient notice"
defense stated in the New York Convention pertains to the
selection of an arbitrator under Article V(1)(b), which states that a
party has a defense against enforcement if the party can prove that
it was "not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator
or of the arbitration proceeding. '230 The appellants, however, did
not offer this enumerated defense, nor was such a defense evident
from the record.3
The Eleventh Circuit attacked the appellants' contention by
examining case law dealing with the issue of admitting evidence
into an arbitration proceeding.232 The Eleventh Circuit, for
example, turned to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Grovner v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., which clearly stated that arbitration
proceedings are not required to follow "all the niceties of federal
courts" and only need to provide the parties with a "fundamentally
fair" hearing. 233 Although the holding was effectively overruled in
First Option of Chicago, Inc. ,234 the Eleventh Circuit, in Robbins v.
Day, clearly illustrated the flexibility of an arbitration
proceeding. 235 For instance, the Eleventh Circuit stated that an
arbitrator is granted "wide latitude" in carrying out the arbitration
228 Id. at 1444.
229 See The New York Convention, art. V, reprinted in note following 9 U.S.C.S.
§ 201 (1971) (outlining available defenses against enforcement of arbitral award).
230 Id. art. V(1)(b).
231 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1442-43.
232 See id. at 1443-45.
233 Grovner v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 625 F.2d 1289, 1290 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing
Wells v. Southern Airways, Inc., 616 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1980)).
234 See supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text (discussing First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan's holding that the standard of review is an "ordinary standard,"
not an "abuse of discretion" standard, therefore effectively overruling the standard as
provided for in Robbins v. Day).
235 See Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679 (1 1th Cir. 1992), overruled by First Options
of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
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proceedings.236 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the
arbitrator is not required to hear all pieces of evidence.237 The
arbitrator need only 'allow each party "the opportunity to present
its argument and evidence." '238 Although the point made in
Robbins speaks to the exclusion of evidence, the Eleventh Circuit
relied in part on this case to support its inclusion of the TUV
239
report.
2. Admission of Expert Testimony-Violation of "Public
Plicy" ?
Another issue raised in Industrial Risk Insurers was whether
the arbitrator wrongfully admitted the testimony of an expert
witness who once worked with the opposing party. 240  The
Eleventh Circuit noted that the appellants did not cite to rules of
procedure or evidence for its contention.24' Instead, the appellants
turned to rules of professional conduct, which deal with attorney-
242
client privilege, work product, and conflict of interest issues.
The Eleventh Circuit examined precedent from numerous
districts. 243
The Tenth Circuit, in Durflinger v. Artiles, ruled that the issue
of relevancy lies within the discretion of the court.24 The Tenth
Circuit, furthermore, stated that decisions concerning testimonial
relevancy and competency of a witness will be reversed only upon
236 Id. at 685.
237 See id.
238 Id. (citing Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co., 915 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir.
1990)).
239 See Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1444 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (stating that the admission of the report by the arbitration
panel was not a failure of the panel to adhere to the party's arbitration agreement). The
TUV report was a technical report detailing the causes of the mechanical malfunctions
written by the German technical institute Rheinisch-Westfalischer Technischer
Uberwachung Verein. See id. at 1442.
240 See id. at 1444-45.
241 See id.
242 See id.
243 See id.
244 See Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1984).
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a showing that the trial judge abused hisiscretionary powers." In
Geralnes B. V. v. City of Greenwood Village,4 6 the Colorado
district court denied a motion for disqualification of counsel
because of the "convoluted" path by which counsel could have
obtained information.247 The district court, moreover, stated that it
was the movant's burden to show that the opposing party's
counsel should be disqualified. 24' The movants, however, failed to
show that opposing counsel owed any duty to them when it
interviewed two attorneys who once represented the movants'
249predecessors in interest.
The Eleventh Circuit examined another district court holding
in MMR/Wallace Powers & Industrial, Inc. v. Thames Associates,
in which an attorney's ex parte contacts with a former employee of
an adversary required his disqualification as counsel.25° The
district court stated that the federal courts had inherent authority to
discipline attorneys who engaged in professional misconduct
inconsistent with the ethical standards of the bar.25' The court
elaborated that an attorney may not "side-switch" where he
represented a client in an action "substantially related to matters
wherein the attorney had previously acted on behalf of his present
adversary. 252  The appellants in Industrial Risk Insurers also
looked at Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Finance Corp. in
which the district court for the Middle District of Florida held that
an attorney would be disqualified from a lawsuit upon evidence
that the attorney had paid the opposing party's former employee to
disclose confidential information.253 The district court, in addition,
245 See id.
246 609 F. Supp. 191 (D. Colo. 1985).
247 Id. at 193-94. The District Court noted that the "trail of corporate entities,
through which plaintiffs claim successorship to Denver Technological Center, Inc. and
William Pauls, is exceedingly convoluted." Id.
248 See id. at 193.
249 See id.
250 See MMR/Wallace Power & Indus., Inc: v. Thames Assocs., 764 F. Supp. 712,
714 (D. Conn. 1991).
251 See id. at 717 (citing In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 n.6 (1985)).
252 Id. at 719.
253 See Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651, 654
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cited to a two-prong test of disqualification outlined by the
Eleventh Circuit in Norton v. Tallahassee Memorial Hospital.
24
The court indicated that a "reasonable possibility" is enough to
trigger the balancing test by which the court determines whether
the harm to the reputation of the bar outweighs the social interest
in allowing a party to keep its counsel .
As indicated by the Eleventh Circuit, these cases dealing with
issues of attorney-client privilege and confidentiality of work
product, in general, do not deal directly with Industrial Risk
Insurers, which concerns a district court's confirmation of an
international arbitration award.256 If one were to draw an analogy,
however, between the appellants' argument that the arbitration
panel erred in admitting the expert testimony and the discussion of
"side-switching" in MMR/Wallace Power & Industrial, Inc. ,257 one
could argue that "side-switching" is not permitted. Nevertheless,
the situation as described in MMR/Wallace Power & Industrial,
Inc. does not mirror the arbitration proceeding. 28 The Eleventh
(M.D. Fla. 1992).
254 See Norton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Hosp., 689 F.2d 938, 941 (11th Cir. 1982).
First, there must be a "reasonable possibility" that an identifiable impropriety occurred,
but specific proof is not necessary. Rentclub, Inc., 811 F. Supp. at 654. Second, the
court must undergo a balancing test where the likelihood of "public suspicion must
outweigh the social interest" of continuing counsel's participation in the suit. Id.
255 Rentclub, Inc., 811 F. Supp. at 654.
256 See Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1444-45 (11th Cir. 1998).
257 See MMR/Wallace Power & Indus., Inc., 764 F. Supp. at 719.
258 The circumstances in MMR/Wallace Power & Indus., Inc. are distinguishable
from those in Industrial Risk Insurers. Specifically, the issue in MMR/Wallace Power &
Indus., Inc. was whether an attorney's use of confidential information obtained during
his past representation of his present adversary is permissible. See MMRIWallace Power
& Indus., Inc., 764 F. Supp. at 719. The Colorado district court concluded that this
constituted "side-switching," and, thus, the court had to disqualify the attorney. Id. The
situation in Industrial Risk Insurers, however, is different on several points. First, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 does not apply to
arbitration proceedings unless the parties agree to it. See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141
F.3d at 1445, 1445 n.15. Second, attorney-client privilege was not the central issue in
Industrial Risk Insurers because Barnard and Burk had not alleged that the expert
witness had divulged any privileged information. See id. at 1445. Furthermore, the
testimony did not rely on confidential work-product or information about litigation
strategy. See id. Finally, the expert witness was not called by either party but by the
arbitration panel, itself. See id.
1999]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VoL 24
Circuit made note of this discrepancy and chose to fall back on the
defenses of the New York Convention and their application.259
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
the Supreme Court reviewed the defenses against arbitral
awards.260 Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he
Convention reserves to each signatory country the right to refuse
enforcement of an award where the 'recognition or enforcement of
the award would be contrary to the public policy of that
country.' ' 26' The award is only reviewable when the party wishing1 62
to vacate the award raises a defense. The Supreme Court in
Mitsubishi noted that substantive review of the enforcement of an
arbitral award's enforcement should be .minimal . 263 The only
mechanism in place to refute enforcement of an award lies in
Article V of the New York Convention 64
The Eleventh Circuit stated in Drummond Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers, District 20265 that in order to establish that a
domestic arbitration award was a violation of "public policy," the
moving party had to show the award violated an "explicit public
policy. ' 266 This "explicit public policy" needs to be "well-defined
239 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1445.
260 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
638-39 (1985).
261 Id. at 638.
262 See id. at 656-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Arbitration awards are only
reviewable for manifest disregard of the law, 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 207, and the rudimentary
procedures which make arbitration so desirable in the context of a private dispute often
mean that the record is so inadequate that the arbitrator's decision is virtually
unreviewable.").
263 See id. at 638. The dissent in Mitsubishi argued that to rest the holding
completely on the federal policy favoring arbitration reaches beyond what the FAA and
the New York Convention is permitted to hear. See id. at 641 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[The Supreme Court] rests almost exclusively on the federal policy favoring
arbitration of commercial disputes and vague notions of international comity."
(emphasis added)). Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that in order for an international
arbitration to serve its purpose and to be successful, it cannot be applied too broadly.
See id. at 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It must be limited to the tasks it is "capable of
performing well." Id. (Stevens,'J., dissenting).
264 See The New York Convention, art. V, reprinted in note following 9 U.S.C.S.
§ 201 (1971).
265 748 F.2d 1495 (11 th Cir. 1984).
266 Id. at 1499 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ENFORCEMENT
and dominant. 2 67 It needs to be ascertainable "by reference to the
laws and legal precedent," not derived from some general
consideration of public interests.26 Although Drummond Coal Co.
was a domestic arbitration, other courts have recognized the
"public policy" defense's applicability to international
arbitration.69
A decade earlier, the Second Circuit had applied the notion of
a "public policy" defense to the international arbitration context in
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Societe Generale de
l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) 7  The Second Circuit cited to the
legislative history of Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention,
which indicated that the Convention's predecessor described a
"public policy" defense as needing to demonstrate that the awards
were "contrary to principles of law" and were "violative of
fundamental principles of law."27' The Second Circuit also cited to
numerous commentators who illustrated conflicting views."' The
Second Circuit, however, decided to probe into the history of the
New York Convention and found that an expansive reading of the
"public policy" defense against the confirmation of arbitral awards
would be inconsistent with the New York Convention's purpose of
expediting resolutions to international commercial disputes. 3
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, 461 U.S. 757, 766
(1983).
267 An earlier Supreme Court decision stated that any defense against a contract
(including arbitration agreements) arguing that the contract should be held
unenforceable because it would violate public policy would be permitted only when the
violation is of a "well-defined," "explicit public policy." W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at
766.
268 Id.
269 See infra notes 270-73 and accompanying text.
270 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
271 Id. at 973 (citing the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Sept. 26, 1997, 92 L.N.T.S. 301).
272 See id. (citing 'Contini, supra note 99, at 304; Quigley, supra note 1, at 1070-
71). Contini's view was that the absence of specific language speaking to the meaning
of "public policy" should be construed to mean a narrowing of the defense. See Parsons
& Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc., 508 F.2d at 973. Quigley's view was the exact
opposite. He stated that the omission of specific language should be interpreted to mean
that the "public policy" defense under Article V(2)(b) is to be read broadly. See id.
273 See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc., 508 F.2d at 973-74. The Second
Circuit believed that the "public policy" defense should be construed as narrowly as
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The Sixth Circuit stated, in M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH
& Co., KG, 74 that the New York Convention "lists the exclusive
grounds justifying refusal to recognize an arbitral award." 275
Furthermore, the party moving to refuse the arbitration award must
find its grounds within the enumerated defenses or within the FAA
to the extent that the provisions do not conflict with the New York
276Convention. Although the FAA has an implied "manifest
disregard of the law" defense, the New York Convention contains
no such language. Such a defense, therefore, cannot be grounds
to vacate an arbitration award.27s
The Eleventh Circuit, in Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N.
Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, resolved this issue of whether the
admission of expert witness testimony violated "fundamental
principles of fairness and professional conduct., 279 It stated that
the attorney-client privilege and work-product cases that the
petitioners cited were not applicable to their sit. .280pettioerscitd  t lc e  irSitUation. The
Eleventh Circuit even stated that if it were to give the appellants
the benefit of the doubt and presume that there was a rule against
"side-switching," the parties would have had to agree to apply
possible and would deny an arbitration award only when "enforcement would violate the
forum state's most basic notions of morality and justice." Id. at 974.
274 87 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 1996).
275 Id. at 851 (holding that the appellate court was without jurisdiction to refuse to
confirm an arbitral award on the grounds that the arbitrator showed a manifest disregard
for the law).
276 See id.; 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1998).
277 M & C Corp., 87 F.3d at 850-51(citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37
(1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)). In addition, as in any contractual relationship,
authority and guidance is derived from the contract itself. Thus, in this case, the
arbitrator's authority is derived from the arbitration agreement. See Szuts v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830, 831 (1 1th Cir. 1991). Furthermore, in the nature of
contractual law, the parties may specify the particular arbitration rules to be abided by
during the proceedings, and these rules set forth in the agreement would be incorporated
to the extent that they do not conflict with the provisions of the agreement itself. See id.
at 831-32.
278 SeeM & C. Corp., 87 F.3d at 851.
279 Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434,
1444 (11 th Cir. 1998).
280 See id. at 1445.
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such a rule."' Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
the "public policy" defense will only be applied when the
appellants make a clear showing that there is some "explicit public
policy" that is "well-defined" and is supported by legal
precedent.2 Such a defense must be narrowly construed in order
to preserve the purpose of international arbitration."'
3. Whether or Not There Is a Defense of "Arbitrary and
Capricious"
The courts generally have held that a great degree of deference
should be given to the goals of the New York Convention and to
the arbitrator's decision-making abilities 24 Therefore, in order to
show that the arbitrator's decision should be vacated, the party
raising the defense against enforcement must derive its defense
from those provided within the appropriate statutory provisions."'
The Eleventh Circuit has indicated that some federal courts have
derived other defenses apart from 9 U.S.C. § 10.286 Specifically,
these courts have allowed two non-statutory defenses: one where
the arbitrator's decision was "arbitrary and capricious",287 and
another where the arbitrator showed a "manifest disregard for the
law.,, s
An award may be considered "arbitrary and capricious" if the
basis for the arbitrator's decision could not be derived from the
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 See id.; see also supra notes 270-73 and accompanying text (discussing the New
York Convention's public policy defense under Article V(2)(b)).
284 See Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 682 (11th Cir. 1992), overruled by First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (citing Booth v. Hume Publ'g,
Inc., 902 F.2d 925, 931-32 (11 th Cir. 1990)).
285 See Robbins, 954 F.2d at 682-83; 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1998) (covering domestic
arbitration); The New York Convention, art. V, reprinted in note following 9 U.S.C.S.
§ 201 (1971) (applying to international arbitration).
286 See Robbins, 954 F.2d at 683 (citing O.R. Securities, Inc. v. Prof'I Planning
Assoc., 857 F.2d 742, 746 (11th Cir. 1988)); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986).
287 Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1458 (1 1th Cir. 1997).
288 Robbins, 954 F.2d at 683.
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facts of the case.289 If such a finding is made, an award that is
deemed "arbitrary and capricious" need not be upheld.2 90 Some
courts may interpret the phrase "arbitrary and capricious" also to
mean an award that is completely "irrational., 29' An arbitral award
may also be vacated on the non-statutory grounds that the
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.292 In order to get relief
on these grounds, the party moving to vacate must show that the
arbitrator knew the applicable law and explicitly disregarded it.293
The Sixth Circuit, for example, has stated that "in order to
constitute a manifest disregard of the law," the issue on review
must be "obvious and capable of being readily and instantly
perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an
arbitrator."2 94  In either case, "arbitrary and capricious" or
"manifest disregard of the law," it is rare to vacate an arbitral
award on such grounds. 295  Generally, when parties agree to
arbitration, they essentially are agreeing "to accept whatever
reasonable uncertainties might arise from the process. 296  In
foreign arbitral awards, moreover, the parties are confined by the
mandates of the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the
FAA. 297
289 See Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410,
1413 (11th Cir. 1990).
290 See Ainsworth v. Skumick, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (11th Cir. 1992).
29 1 Drummond Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 20, 748 F.2d
1495, 1497 (1 lth Cir. 1984).
292 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (citing
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,436-37 (1953)).
293 See Raiford, 903 F.2d at 1412.
294 M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG, 87 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir.
1996) (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930,
933 (2d Cir. 1986)).
295 See Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 683 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (citing Advest Inc. v.
McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1990)). "An arbitration board that incorrectly
interprets the law has not manifestly disregarded it. It has simply made a legal mistake.
To manifestly disregard the law, one must be conscious of the law and deliberately
ignore it." Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 (1 1th Cir.
1997) (citing O.R. Sec. v. Prof'l Planning Assoc., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (lth Cir.
1988)).
296 Raiford, 903 F.2d at 1413.
297 See The New York Convention, art. V, reprinted in note following 9 U.S.C.S.
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In 1990 the Eleventh Circuit in Raiford v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. stated that domestic arbitral awards
may be vacated for several distinct reasons.! Five categories of
defenses against confirmation of an arbitral award are provided in
9 U.S.C. 10.2 The Eleventh Circuit noted, however, that several
federal courts, including the Tenth and Second Circuits, have also
come to recognize non-statutory grounds for vacation.30
Specifically, numerous circuits have mentioned two similar
defenses, a "manifest disregard of the law," and an "arbitrary and
capricious" defense against upholding arbitration awards.3'
The Eleventh Circuit defined "manifest disregard of the law"
as "more than error or misunderstanding with respect of the
law."3 2 In its holding the Eleventh Circuit provided a three-step
analysis to determine whether an arbitrator manifestly disregarded
the law.303 First, the party moving to vacate must show that the
error was so blatant that the arbitrator would instantaneously
perceive it.304 Second, the party must show that the arbitrator was
aware of the proper legal standard but blatantly disregarded it in
granting the award.3 5 Finally, the intentional disregard of the law
must be apparent in the arbitration record.3°6 The Eleventh Circuit,
however, noted that it has never adopted this defense because such
a standard would never be applicable due to the fact that
arbitrators are not required to, and rarely do, give reasons for their
awards.307 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit provided a definition
§ 201 (1971); see also supra notes 211-83 and accompanying text (discussing the
enumerated defenses of the New York Convention).
298 See Raiford, 903 F.2d at 1412.
299 See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1998).
300 See, e.g., Raiford, 903 F.2d at 1412 (citing Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Secs.,
Inc., 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 808
F.2d at 930 (2d Cir. 1986)).
301 Raiford, 903 F.2d at 1412.
302 Id. (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 808 F.2d at 933).
303 See id.
31 See id. at 1412-13 (citing O.R. Secs., Inc. v. Prof 1 Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d
742, 747 (1 1th Cir. 1988)).
305 See id.
306 See id. at 1412-13.
307 See id. at 1413. The Eleventh Circuit indicated that arbitration proceedings are
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of "arbitrary and capricious" in its decision in Raiford.°s The
court indicated that an award is arbitrary and capricious if the
grounds for the arbitrator's decision "cannot be inferred from the
facts of the case."3°
In Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc. ,1 the Eleventh
Circuit elaborated on its "arbitrary and capricious" defense for
vacating domestic arbitral awards.3 1' Not only did the Eleventh
Circuit apply its holdings in its previous decisions, but the court
also applied another reason to vacate an award on grounds that it
was "arbitrary and capricious." '312 It stated that a court may also
refuse to uphold an arbitral award if the award is "not grounded in
the contract which provides for the arbitration."3"3
Although courts have recognized the existence of these
alternative defenses in domestic awards,314 the New York
Convention places a limit on their application in foreign arbitral
awards."5 Illustratively, 9 U.S.C. § 207 indicates that a federal
court must confirm an arbitration award unless the court finds
grounds for refusal of the enforcement specified in the New York
Convention. 3" The New York Convention clearly states that
"summary in nature," which goes to the appeal of arbitration's expediency. Id. (citing
Legion Ins. Co. v. Insurance Gen. Agency, Inc., 822 F.2d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 1987)). But
see Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1460 (stating that every
circuit, except the Fifth, has allowed the argument of the arbitrator's "manifest disregard
of the law" as a reason to review an arbitral decision).
308 Raiford, 903 F.2d at 1413.
309 Id. (quoting Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 894 (2d Cir. 1985)); see
also Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (11 th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
915 (1993) (holding that an award that is arbitrary and capricious is not required to be
enforced by the courts).
310 994 F.2d 775 (11 th Cir. 1993).
311 See id. at 781.
312 Id. The first reason was that the award demonstrated a "wholesale departure
from the law." Id. (citing Ainsworth, 960 F.2d at 941).
313 Id. (citing United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 847
F.2d 775, 778 (1 1th Cir. 1988)).
314 See Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1458 (11th Cir.
1997).
311 See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15,
19 (2d Cir. 1997).
316 See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1998).
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enforcement of the arbitration award may be refused only if the
party moving to vacate proves one of the enumerated defenses.3 17
The New York Convention does not indicate that these non-
statutory defenses are to be included in the exclusive list of already
provided for defenses.31 Thus, taking the narrow interpretations of
"manifest disregard of the law" and "arbitrary and capricious," in
conjunction with the restrictive language of the New York
Convention, it will be a rare occurrence when one of these non-
statutory defenses is used to defend against confirmation of an
arbitral award.319
D. Prejudgment Interest
In Industrial Risk Insurers, M.A.N GHH, on cross-appeal,
contested the district court's refusal to grant M.A.N GHH
prejudgment interest. ° Thus, the Eleventh Circuit examined this
issue as well, basing its authority on Chapter 2 of the FAA, the
New York Convention. 1
Although this issue was not within the context of an
international arbitration proceeding, the Eleventh Circuit had
analyzed this issue previously in Osterneck v. E.T. Barwickr 322
Industries, Inc., in which the court held that prejudgment interest
317 See The New York Convention, art. V, reprinted in note following 9 U.S.C.S.
§ 201 (1971).
318 Given the process of statutory interpretation, the clear omission of an "arbitrary
and capricious" or a "manifest disregard of the law" defense may be understood to be a
decisive one.
319 The probability that the "manifest disregard of the law" defense or the "arbitrary
and capricious" defense would be accepted as a defense in an international arbitration is
especially low considering the language of 9 U.S.C. § 208, which incorporates Chapter 1
only to the extent that it does not conflict with Chapter 2 or the New York Convention.
See 9 U.S.C.A. § 208 (1998). This probability is cut down to virtually zero when one
looks at the restrictive language in 9 U.S.C. § 207, which states that a court "shall
confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition
or enforcement of the award specified in the said Convention." 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1998).
320 See Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1446 (11th Cir. 1998); see generally John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Interest in
International Arbitrations, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 40 (1996) (discussing the problems
involved in awarding compensatory interest in international arbitration proceedings).
321 See id.
322 825 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1987).
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was proper, given the weight of the equities.3 23  The Eleventh
Circuit, relying on precedent from the Fifth Circuit stated,
"prejudgment interest... is a question of fairness resting within
the District Court's sound discretion."'3 24 Furthermore, the award
of prejudgment interest cannot be punitive in nature; rather it is a
compensatory measure and is determinable upon the assessment of
the equities.325
Other cases, however, have addressed the application of
prejudgment interest in the arbitration context. For example, the
Second Circuit in Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v.
International Navigation Ltd. held that prejudgment interest is
permitted in actions under the New York Convention with regard
to the enforcement of arbitral awards.3 26 The Second Circuit drew
strong parallels between a district court's ability to award
prejudgment interest under the context of formal litigation and
awards under the auspices of the New York Convention.
3 27
The Second Circuit indicated three reasons to uphold
prejudgment interest in arbitration. First, the Second Circuit stated
that in cases arising under federal law, granting of prejudgment
interest is left to the discretion of the courts.3 28 Because this action
is within the New York Convention and is, therefore, "under the
laws and treaties of the United States," the district court has the
power to award prejudgment interest.329 Second, because the
Convention remains silent on the issue, the Second Circuit
interpreted the silence to indicate that the Convention does not
explicitly forbid such awards. 30  The Second Circuit's third
suggestion was that the reasons for awarding prejudgment interest
in litigation are equally applicable for awards in arbitration
323 See id. at 1536.
324 Id. (quoting Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 479 (5th Cir. 1973)).
325 See id.
326 See Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. International Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d
150, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1984).
327 See id.
328 See id. at 153.
329 Id. at 154 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 203 (West 1998)).
330 See Waterside Ocean Navigation Co., 737 F.2d at 154.
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proceedings.331
In 1990 the district court of Delaware succinctly articulated a
four-factor inquiry as to whether a district court exercised its
discretion to award prejudgment interest in an international
arbitration.332 According to National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil
Co., the court must consider: "(1) whether the claimant has been
less than diligent in prosecuting the action; (2) whether the
defendant has been unjustly enriched; (3) whether an award would
be compensatory" rather than punitive; and "(4) whether
countervailing equitable considerations 'mandate' against a
surcharge. '33  Generally, absent clear reasons to the contrary,
prejudgment interest should be granted to make the injured party
whole again.1
34
E. Rule 11 Sanctions
In Industrial Risk Insurers, MAN GHH challenged the district
court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions for MAN GHH's motion
for preliminary injunction. 35  Barnard and Burk had argued that
MAN GHH's motion was an "improper attempt to relitigate an
issue. 336 MAN GHH, however, contended that the district court
erred in finding that there was no support in the record for MAN
GHH's claims.337 To resolve this issue, the Eleventh Circuit relied
on cases related to the aforementioned dispute.338
331 See id. One of the main reasons to grant prejudgment interest is to make whole
the party who was financially injured by its adversary. See id. The Eleventh Circuit
adheres to the view that prejudgment interest is not a punitive measure but a
compensatory one. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. M/V Ocean Lynx, a/k/a M/V Ocean
Link, 901 F.2d 934, 942 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (citing Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 832 F.2d 1540, 1550 (11th Cir. 1987)).
332 See National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 800, 821 (D. Del.
1990).
"I Id. (citing Feather v. United Mine Workers of Am., 711 F.2d 530, 540 (3d Cir.
1983)).
31 See id. at 821-22 (citing Waterside Ocean Navigation Co., 737 F.2d at 154).
331 See Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1447-48 (1lth Cir. 1998); FED. R. Civ. P. l1(b).
336 Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1449.
331 See id.
338 See infra notes 339-50 and accompanying text (discussing the application of
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 24
The Eleventh Circuit first looked to case law discussing the
general framework of Rule 11 sanctions.33 9 "The purpose of Rule
11 is to reduce frivolous claims, defenses or motions and to deter
meritless maneuvers, thus avoiding unnecessary delay and expense
in litigation. 340 In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of
Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the purpose of the FAA is to enforce privately
negotiated arbitration agreements, not to "mandate the arbitration
of all claims. 34' Furthermore, because the arbitration agreement is
to be granted the authority of a contract, the parties to the
arbitration should be given the freedom to designate the terms
under which they will arbitrate.342 In another decision, Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., the Supreme Court
stated that the purpose of the FAA was to make arbitration
agreements enforceable in federal courts.343
In Industrial Risk Insurers, the Eleventh Circuit found that the
district court's order to compel arbitration was based on the
parties' design contract arbitration clause. 344 Any issues that the
Rule I 1 sanctions). The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court abused its
discretion when it applied Rule 11 sanctions. See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at
1449.
131 See id. at 1448. When the court is confronted with a motion for Rule 11
sanctions, the court must first ask whether the party's claims are frivolous. See
Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252, 1254 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (citing Jones
v. International Riding Helmets, Ltd., 49 F.3d 692, 694 (1 1th Cir. 1995)). If the court
has determined that they are, then the court must then determine whether the person who
signed the pleadings was aware of the frivolity. See id. Furthermore, if the attorney
failed to make a reasonable inquiry, then the court must impose Rule 11 sanctions. See
id. The purpose of the Rule 11 sanction, moreover, is to deter claims that have no
factual or legal basis. See Davis v. Carl, 906 F.2d 533, 538 (11th Cir. 1990).
34 Pierce v. Commercial Warehouse, 142 F.R.D. 687, 691 (M.D. Fla. 1992)(citing
Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11 th Cir. 1987)).
341 Id. at 472. The FAA does not require parties to arbitrate issues that have not
been agreed upon, nor does the FAA prevent the parties from excluding issues. See id.
at 478.
342 See id. at 472.
141 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 422 (1967).
But see id. at 422 (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing that the FAA was not meant to
create a body of federal substantive law that would be so broad as to preclude the
powers of state courts to interpret contracts).
344 See Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1449-50 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
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parties wished to submit to arbitration that arose from the service
contracts were outside of the purview of the district court's
jurisdiction.345 The district court, therefore, could not compel
arbitration of these claims, and the arbitration panel heard these
claims outside of the district court's command.346
The case law preceding Industrial Risk Insurers reflects the
circuits' varying degrees of compliance with the congressional
purpose behind accession to the New York Convention. Some
circuit courts reflected a more deferential treatment of the New
York Convention by applying an "abuse of discretion" standard
when faced with appeals from district courts in the matter of
arbitral awards.3 47  However, other circuits exercised a less
restrained look at arbitration. 34' The Supreme Court itself seemed
to be split on the matter, as illustrated in Mitsubishi Motor Corp.
349
In all the case law, however, the congressional intent and purpose
are clear. The New York Convention is intended not only to
provide a different forum to resolve international commercial
disputes but also to provide a faster, easier and more economical
method of resolution.350
IV. Significance of the Case
Prior to Industrial Risk Insurers, courts upheld arbitral awards
on the grounds that the congressional intent favored arbitration of
international commercial transactions over litigation,35' and the
United States' accession to the New York Convention was meant
to "encourage the recognition and enforcement of international
arbitral awards. 352  In Industrial Risk Insurers, the Eleventh
315 See id. at 1450.
346 See id.
14 See Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 681 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
348 See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 941 (1995)
(noting that the Third Circuit applied a de novo standard of review in this case).
349 See Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638
(1985) (illustrating that "the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substantive
review at the award-enforcement stage remain minimal").
350 See Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (11 th Cir. 1981).
351 See Mitsubishi Motor Corp., 473 U.S. at 638-40.
352 Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Circuit reemphasized the need to give great deference to
arbitration awards, not only in the interest of international comity,
but also in the interest of reducing caseloads in the judicial system
and providing an alternative to resolving commercial disputes.353
By denying the appellants the "arbitrary and capricious" defense,
the Eleventh Circuit drove home the notion that courts, in general,
show a strong favoritism for arbitration by clearly indicating that
parties seeking to vacate an international award are strictly limited
to the enumerated defenses of the New York Convention. 54
A. History and Statutory Interpretation
Industrial Risk Insurers provides a look into the history and
purpose of the New York Convention through the lens of Chapter
2 of the FAA. The Eleventh Circuit examined the congressional
intent of the New York Convention and found that its purpose was
to encourage the recognition of international arbitral awards, and
to provide a more efficient and economical forum for dispute
resolution.5 Furthermore, in order to uphold the purpose of the
New York Convention, the Eleventh Circuit construed the New
York Convention and its counterpart in 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 to be
carried out unequivocally. As indicated by prior courts, Chapter 2
establishes a very strong presumption in favor of arbitrating
international commercial disputes.356 In addition, to further the
legislative purpose, the statute created original federal subject
matter jurisdiction over actions arising under the New York
Convention.357 By giving the courts subject matter jurisdiction, the
New York Convention and the FAA provide them with the
authority to make those federal provisions the "highest law of the
land," preempting any prior conflicting laws.358 Furthermore, it
... See Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 664 F.2d at 1179.
I" See Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1445-46 (1 lth Cir. 1998).
311 See id. at 1440.
356 See id. (citing Mitsubishi Motor Corp., 473 U.S. at 638-40).
311 See id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1998) ("The district courts of the United
States... shall have original jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, regardless
of the amount in controversy.").
358 Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co. (Pemex), 767 F.2d
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gives the courts the ability to "unify the standard by which the
agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are
enforced in signatory countries."'359 The Eleventh Circuit readily
adopted these provisions and adamantly trumpeted the
enforcement of arbitration awards by construing motions to vacate
quite narrowly, requiring its district courts to do the same.360
B. Jurisdiction
The Eleventh Circuit inquired sua sponte into the source of its
jurisdiction.16 ' According to the New York Convention, sections
of Chapter 2 of the FAA confer original jurisdiction upon the
district courts to hear international arbitration cases.362 The
Eleventh Circuit concisely outlined the scope of the New York
Convention. Specifically, the New York Convention covers any
arbitration agreement or arbitral award that arises from a
commercial transaction that is not entirely between citizens of the
United States.3 63  Such commercial transactions occur when the
transaction involves property outside of the United States or some
other reasonable relationship with other foreign states.3
64
In contrast, Chapter 1 of the FAA does not have such language
365
conferring federal subject matter jurisdiction upon the courts.
1140, 1145-46 (5th Cir. 1985). The New York Convention, in effect, replicates the
FAA. See id. The FAA, moreover, was instituted to overcome common law hostility
towards arbitration that was due in part to the state court's perception of being "ousted"
from its jurisdiction. See H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1924).
"I Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co, 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974). Another
congressional intent of the New York Convention and the FAA was to assure that the
signatory countries would enforce the parties' arbitration agreement and not "diminish
the mutually binding nature" of the agreements. Id.
36 See Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1439-41 (11 th Cir. 1998).
361 See id. at 1439.
362 See 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1998). 9 U.S.C. § 203 provides: "An action or proceeding
falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the
United States. The district courts of the United States (including the courts enumerated
in section 460 of title 28) shall have original jurisdiction over such an action or
proceeding, regardless of the amount in controversy." Id. (emphasis added).
363 See 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1998).
364 See Jain v. de Mere, 51 F.3d 686, 689 (7th Cir. 1995).
365 See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1998) (providing the general provisions of the
FAA).
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Instead, 9 U.S.C. § 9 states that the "court must grant such an
order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as
prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title."366 Therefore, when
the court is under the authority of Chapter 1 of the FAA, it does
not hold original jurisdiction; rather, it only holds the power to
vacate or modify an award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 and 11 of
Chapter 1.367 Specifically, the appellate court decides questions of
law de novo, regardless of whether the district court has vacated or
affirmed an arbitration award.
368
The Eleventh Circuit looked to the First, Second, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits. Some held that "non-domestic" arbitration
agreements and awards were controlled by the New York
Convention because "they were made within the legal framework
of another country. 3 69 According to the Eleventh Circuit, the
district court erroneously based its jurisdiction on diversity and
applied Chapter 1 of the FAA, which covers domestic
arbitration. 30  The Eleventh Circuit undertook an extensive
analysis to determine this issue of first impression: whether the
New York Convention and the provision of Chapter 2 of the FAA
must be applied to an arbitration agreement and award granted to a
foreign entity by an arbitration panel sitting in the United States
and applying American federal or state law.371' By examining
abundant case law supporting the notion that the purpose of the
New York Convention was to "encourage the recognition and
enforcement of international arbitral awards," the Eleventh Circuit
reached the conclusion that the New York Convention and Chapter
366 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1998) (emphasis added).
367 See id.
368 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947-49 (1995).
369 Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434,
1441 (11 th Cir. 1998) (citing Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d
Cir. 1983)).
370 See id. at 1440. Due to the district court's conclusion that its authority to hear
the case was derived from diversity jurisdiction, the district court held that its review of
the international arbitration proceedings was grounded in Chapter 1 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, codified in 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 in 1994. See id. at 1439-40; see also
generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1998) (indicating general provisions of the FAA).
371 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1440.
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2 of the FAA govern such an international arbitral award.372
The Eleventh Circuit went through a systematic parsing of the
New York Convention's language as set forth in 9 U.S.C. § 201 et
seq. The court recognized that Chapter 2 of the FAA created
original federal subject matter jurisdiction over actions arising
under the New York Convention.373 The Eleventh Circuit then
examined what was meant to encompass "actions arising under"
the New York Convention. In so doing, the Eleventh Circuit
investigated the meaning of "non-domestic. 374 Specifically, the
Eleventh Circuit looked at 9 U.S.C. § 202, which states that
arbitration awards arising out of commercial transactions are under
the New York Convention except those that are domestic, i.e.,
between citizens of the United States.375 The Eleventh Circuit took
steps to clarify the meaning of "non-domestic." It established that
arbitration awards are "non-domestic" so'long as the award is not
entirely between citizens of the United States.376
Moreover, with its Industrial Risk Insurers decision, the
Eleventh Circuit finally joined the First, Second, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits to hold a broad understanding of the meaning of
"non-domestic." Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit held that "non-
domestic" awards are those that are made between parties that are
not completely United States citizens, and it conceded that "non-
domestic" can be interpreted to mean those awards that were made
within the legal framework of another country.377
The Eleventh Circuit, in its holding in Industrial Risk Insurers,
clarified the district court's apparent confusion in its assumption of
diversity jurisdiction.378  Upon establishing the source of
372 Id. (quoting Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932).
373 See id. at 1440; 9 U.S.C. § 203.
311 Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1440-41.
375 See 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1998).
376 Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1440-41.
377 Id. (citing Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983)).
378 See id. at 1446. It appeared that the district court took the parties' motion that
its case should be heard in the federal court on grounds of diversity. Thus, the district
court presumably stooped its analysis at that point and did not inquire further into the
nature of the arbitration agreement. However, the appellate court viewed the source of
jurisdiction as an obvious threshold matter and inquired sua sponte. See id. at 1439-40
(citing Miscott Corp. v. Zaremba Walden Co., 848 F.2d 1190, 1192 (1 1th Cir. 1988)).
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jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit made the definitive statement
that an arbitration award that is made within the United States,
under American law, which is granted to a foreign corporation is
under the authority of the New York Convention."'
C. Enumerated Defenses
The Eleventh Circuit's holding in Industrial Risk Insurers
reiterated the strong presumption in favor of arbitration. By
holding that a party seeking to vacate an arbitral award is limited
to the enumerated defenses of Article V, the Eleventh Circuit did
not permit any leeway for the "arbitrary and capricious" defense to
be incorporated into one of the seven defenses of the New York
Convention.8 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit seemed to take a
"plain language" approach to the Convention and construed the
New York Convention's defenses as narrowly as possible. 8 ' The
court's interpretations favor arbitration and the reduction of the
risk of vacating arbitral awards.
38 2
The Eleventh Circuit clearly indicated, however, that there are
differences between litigation and arbitration procedure.383 Where
litigation is confined by rules of procedure and evidence,
arbitration enjoys the opportunity to structure its proceedings in
accordance with the parties' wishes.3 4 The Eleventh Circuit stated
that an arbitration proceeding need not follow all the formalities of
3 See id. at 1441. Another aspect of this issue is the parties themselves. This case
seems not only to deal with the jurisdictional issue but also a simple "permutation-
combination" perspective of party citizenship with respect to the location of the
arbitration.
380 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1446.
381 Id. at 1445 (stating that if concerns of breach of client confidentiality or work
product were raised by the admission of the expert testimony, the court could not
consider such matters unless they fell under one of the enumerated defenses of the New
York Convention).
382 It appears that the court read Article V of the New York Convention to mean
that a party seeking to vacate an award must find a basis to vacate only under one of the
seven enumerated defenses. See the New York Convention, art. V, reprinted in note
following 9 U.S.C.S. § 201 (1971).
383 See id. at 1443-44.
1'4 See id.
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litigation, and need only provide a "fundamentally fair hearing. 3 5
The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the AAA Rules, which the parties
agreed to use in their arbitration, to provide arbitrators with a great
deal of discretion in the exchange of evidence.3 6 Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit created a precedent that will not only broaden the
scope of arbitration but also relax the standards within the
proceedings themselves.
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the evidentiary
issue of whether to permit testimony of an expert witness who was
once retained by the opposing party.387 The Eleventh Circuit
examined the supporting case law that the appellants presented to
the court. The cases were limited to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26,388 attorney-client privilege, and confidentiality of
work product.3 9  The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
combined effect of the rules is to stifle a party's ability to utilize
the opposing party's expert witness.39 However, the Eleventh
Circuit asserted that it would not apply a "blanket rule" against
"side-switching."'3 9' To legitimize its position, the Eleventh Circuit
noted that the expert did not divulge any privileged information,
nor did the expert rely upon any confidential work product in his
testimony.392 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit drew distinctions
between a witness being called by a party and a witness being
called by the arbitration panel itself.3 93 The appellants had relied
385 Id. at 1443 (quoting Grovner v. Georgia-Pacific, 625 F.2d 1289, 1290 (5th Cir.
Unit B 1980)). The Eleventh Circuit mentioned that the appellants were attempting to
attack the admitted evidence on grounds that the admissions made the proceedings
"fundamentally unfair." Id. at 1442-43. However the court indicated that this was not
the case because the appellants had plenty of opportunity to rebut the report and
testimony and did so. See id. at 1444 n. 11.
386 See id. at 1443 ("the AAA will make arrangements for the exchange of
documentary evidence").
387 See id. at 1444.
388 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (providing general provisions that govern the process of
disclosure and the duty to disclose).
389 See id. at 1444-45.
390 See id at 1445.
391 Id.
392 See id. at 1445.
393 See id.
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upon cases where the opposing parties called the controversial
witness; however, in Industrial Risk Insurers, the arbitration panel
called the expert witness itself.394 The Eleventh Circuit seemed to
resolve the "side-switching" dispute on a technicality. But for the
arbitration panel calling the expert witness, the witness would
have been deemed to have "side-switched," which is not
permitted.9
The Eleventh Circuit seemed to have an uncompromising
position on this matter. Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit
apparently wanted to bolster its foundation even more.3 96 Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit also turned to the New York Convention for
legitimization.397 The Eleventh Circuit relied on the seven grounds
for refusing to enforce an arbitration award.3 98 According to the
Eleventh Circuit, in order to vacate the district court's order
affirming the award, the admissions would have to fall within one
of the seven defenses.3 99  Although the Eleventh Circuit had
originally recognized a few non-statutory defenses, the court
would apply them so narrowly as to make them virtually useless.400
The substantive defenses, therefore, lie solely within the New
194 See id.
395 See MMR/Wallace Power & Indus., Inc. v. Thames Assocs., 764 F. Supp. 712,
719 (D. Conn. 1991).
396 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1445.
397 See id.
398 See id.; see also The New York Convention, art. V, reprinted in note following
9 U.S.C.S. § 201 (1971) (listing the defenses to the enforcement of an international
arbitral award).
399 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1445. This holding seems to indicate a
bit of uncertainty on the part of the Eleventh Circuit. To elaborate, the Eleventh Circuit
seemed initially to ground its decision in the fact that there is no "blanket rule" against
"side-switching." See id. at 1444. However, the Eleventh Circuit then seemed to doubt
itself and searched for other precedent to refute the appellant's contentions. See id. at
1445. In its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit stated that even if there were a rule
disallowing side-switching, it would not control the arbitration proceedings unless the
parties agreed to it. See id. (citing Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 931 F.2d 830,
831 (11 th Cir. 1991)). This logic seems to indicate that the Eleventh Circuit is asking all
parties to arbitration to indicate specifically all the rules that should be included in the
proceeding; otherwise their absence will be interpreted to mean that they do not apply at
all.
"o See Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1462 (1 1th Cir.
1997).
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York Convention and within Chapter 1 of the FAA to the extent
that it does not conflict with the New York Convention.40'
D. Prejudgment Interest
The precedent indicates that granting prejudgment interest in
international arbitral awards is not dictated by any federal statute;
instead, it is at the discretion of the court.402 The courts, moreover,
have shown a trend of awarding prejudgment interest so long as
there is no reason not to award such compensation.4 0 ' The
Eleventh Circuit clearly stated that the award of prejudgment
interest is compensatory, not punitive, in nature. 404 Furthermore, it
noted that because the district court had original federal subject
matter jurisdiction, not diversity jurisdiction, the district court did
405not need to follow state law. Instead, the district court was
guided by federal law, which permits prejudgment interest in the
awarding of post-arbitral awards 406  The Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Industrial Risk Insurers on the matter of prejudgment
interest once again illustrates that international arbitration enjoys
great procedural latitude.407
401 See The New York Convention, art. V, reprinted in note following 9 U.S.C.S.
§ 201 (1971); see also 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1998) (indicating that Chapter 1 is incorporated
into Chapter 2 to the extent that it does not conflict).
4o2 See, e.g. Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. International Navigation Ltd., 737
F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1987); see also supra notes 324-29 and accompanying text
(discussing awarding prejudgment interest at the discretion of the court).
03 See Waterside Ocean Navigation Co., 737 F.2d at 153-54.
" See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1446-47.
405 See id. at 1446.
406 See id.
4 See, e.g., Waterside Ocean Navigation Co., 737 F.2d at 153-54 ("We do not see
why pre-judgment interest should not be available in actions brought under the [New
York] Convention. In these days in which all of us feel the effects of inflation, it is
almost unnecessary to reiterate that only if such interest is awarded will a person
wrongfully deprived of his money be made whole for the loss."). See also Gotanda,
supra note 320, at 50 (discussing several approaches to the process of awarding
interest). In addition to looking at the arbitration agreement for guidance, the "arbitrator
can decide the issue in accordance with general principles of international law or on the
basis of fairness and reasonableness." Id.
1999]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
E. Rule 11 Sanctions
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the application of Rule
11 sanctions. 4°' The Eleventh Circuit applied the sanction analysis
to the context of arbitration proceedings.4  This application
helped create a guideline for the district courts to follow.
Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit, by holding that the district
court's authority was limited to compelling the parties to arbitrate,
indicates that the parties are the masters of their arbitration. ° In
other words, unless the parties specify that certain claims are to be
411arbitrated, the court cannot impose arbitration of those issues.
The Eleventh Circuit clarified the court's role in the imposition
of Rule 11 sanctions as they pertain to arbitration awards.41'2 The
Eleventh Circuit highlighted the powers given to the arbitrator,
which are not necessarily congruently held by the district court. 3
When an arbitrator agrees to hear claims raised in the arbitration
proceeding, these claims are reviewed outside the reach of the
district court.14 The Eleventh Circuit reiterated the notion that the
parties are the only ones who can dictate what issues are
considered arbitrable under the arbitration agreement. 415  The
408 See id. at 1447-48.
409 See id. at 1446-47 (citing Waterside Ocean Navigation Co., 737 F.2d at 153-54).
The Eleventh Circuit cited to cases where prejudgment interest was considered
appropriate in international arbitration as well as domestic arbitration. See id. at 1447
(citing Fort Hill Builders, Inc.v. National Grand Mutual Ins. Co., 866 F.2d 11, 14 (lst
Cir. 1989) (holding that post-award, prejudgment interest is appropriate in domestic
arbitral awards)).
411 Parties need only arbitrate an issue when they have agreed to submit their
conflict to arbitration proceedings. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989). In addition, the parties dictate
within the arbitration agreement which issues will or will not be subject to arbitration.
See id.
411 See id. at 1450; see also supra note 194 (discussing the Supreme Court's hol-
ding that an issue cannot be deemed arbitrable unless the parties had agreed to it).
412 See Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1447-50 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
413 See, e.g., Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 685 (1lth Cir. 1992) (discussing the
latitude given to an arbitrator to conduct an arbitration proceeding); see Industrial Risk
Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1443-44.
414 See id. at 1450.
415 See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., 489 U.S. at 478; Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d
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courts have little discretion to decide arbitrability. 416 As one court
noted, the FAA is designed to make arbitration agreements
enforceable, but it is not designed to do more than that.4 17
V. Conclusion
The Eleventh Circuit examined the background law pertaining
to the statutory issues raised in the case and applied them to the
particular fact pattern of Industrial Risk Insurers.418 It took great
pains to apply cases that addressed issues under Chapter 1 of the
FAA to a Chapter 2 case. Through this cross-application, the court
illustrated the relative complementary natures of Chapters 1 and 2
of the Federal Arbitration Act. The Eleventh Circuit's application
and interpretation of the New York Convention and the relevant
statutory provisions paint a "step-by-step" analysis format.
Specifically, a court must first examine whether an arbitration
agreement exists between the disputing parties. Second, if there is
an agreement, the court must enforce it. The terms of the
arbitration agreement, as in any contract, control the proceeding.
Third, the court must examine whether or not the arbitration is
considered "domestic" or "non-domestic." If it is determined to be
"domestic" in nature, i.e., a dispute between citizens of the United
States, then Chapter 1 of the FAA controls. The federal courts that
hear these cases on review are, therefore, hearing them upon
diversity jurisdiction, and must apply state law. However, if the
dispute is considered "non-domestic," Chapter 2 of the FAA
controls, which grants original federal subject matter jurisdiction
upon the federal courts to hear such matters. In this instance, the
courts may review these cases de novo.
The legislative history has indicated a strong presumption
favoring arbitration of commercial disputes and, in particular,
international commercial disputes. Congress has expressed this
favoritism given arbitration's comparative ease, economy, and
efficiency to litigation. The holding in Industrial Risk Insurers
at 1450.
416 See Industrial Risk Insurers, 141 F.3d at 1449-50.
411 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12
(1967). Until an arbitration agreement is brought before the court by correct pleadings,
the court may not enforce the agreement. See id.
418 See supra notes 22-95 and accompanying text.
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underscores the strong presumption in favor of arbitration of
international commercial transactional disputes. The Eleventh
Circuit's decision is in accordance with the extensive and
applicable precedent. The expansive reading of the New York
Convention facilitates an increased application of international
arbitration, which provides more freedom for the parties involved
as well as a greater chance of reaching some sort of resolution.4 9
Although other circuits may previously have been uncertain of the
reach of the New York Convention, the Eleventh Circuit freed the
district courts to wield their authority to uphold arbitration
decisions as much as possible.
The Eleventh Circuit seems to be looking backward in time to
its holding in Robbins v. Day in which the court held that the
standard of review for an arbitration under Chapter 1 is "abuse of
discretion." This limited review obviously allows courts the
leeway to confirm arbitration awards. However, the Eleventh
Circuit was overruled by the Supreme Court in First Options of
Chicago, Inc., which stated that the standard of review should be
an "ordinary standard of review." The Supreme Court, in holding
that the review is to be "ordinary" and not "abuse of discretion,"
was not abandoning the liberal favoritism for arbitration. Instead,
it attempted to bridle this favoritism. Given this holding, the
Eleventh Circuit should have tempered its zealous confirmation of
arbitral awards and its broad presumptive interpretation of
arbitration agreements. The Eleventh Circuit, however, did not
seem to be complying to the extent that the Supreme Court may
have liked.
The Eleventh Circuit's extreme favoritism for arbitration,
which is carried out with few guidelines and provides the
arbitration panel with an immense amount of discretion, does not
provide a strong "checks and balances" system to protect against
"arbitrary and capricious" decision-making. The courts seem so
eager to affirm arbitral awards that they construe the enumerated
defenses extremely narrowly and do not permit any other plausible
419 See generally, G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations
Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 888 (1995)
(discussing the significant contributions of the New York Convention to dispute
resolution of international commercial transactions).
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defenses that may vacate the arbitral award. The goal of
international arbitration, as interpreted by many courts (especially
the Eleventh Circuit) seems to be the settlement in and of itself,
rather than on the process of reaching settlement. There seems to
be a complete disregard of the consequences.4 0  The Eleventh
Circuit, in upholding the arbitral award and dismissing the
argument of "arbitrary and capricious action," appears to be
proclaiming that the ends justify the means.421 In certain instances,
this theory may be a legitimate one; nevertheless, it is not flawless.
A solution to this problem does not seem to be evident from the
case law or from Congress. Until a better solution arises, the only
apparent method to deal with an international commercial dispute
is to apply this broad arbitration practice so as to avoid many of
the countervailing issues involved, such as conflict of laws,
duplicative litigation, and adverse effects on international comity.
SUZANNE Y. KAo
420 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995). The
Supreme Court noted in First Options of Chicago, Inc. that the basic objective of
upholding arbitration agreements is "not to resolve disputes in the quickest manner, no
matter what the parties' wishes" but to ensure that the arbitration agreements are
conducted according to their contractual terms. Id.
421 See Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d
1434, 1445-46 (lth Cir. 1998). The Eleventh Circuit may have to dismiss the
"arbitrary and capricious" defense on the grounds that the petitioner failed to show that
the arbitrator's decision was based on a complete disregard of the law and therefore,
"arbitrary and capricious." Id. However, the Eleventh Circuit, in addition to dismissing
the party's argument, dismissed this plausible defense all together. See id. The
Eleventh Circuit stated, in effect, that regardless of the facts and circumstances of the
case, such a defense is not permitted because it is not one of the seven enumerated
defenses of the New York Convention. See the New York Convention, art. V, reprinted
in note following 9 U.S.C.S. § 201 (1971).
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